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I. INTRODUCTION
Oceans of ink have been expended describing, analyzing, and ap-
plying the “duty of loyalty” owed by corporate directors and officers.1
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1. Representatives from a very long list of the scholarly articles and books are:
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF COR-
PORATE LAW (1991); Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fair-
ness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 758 n.59 (1978); Lyman
Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL.
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Comparatively little attention has been paid to the common law “duty
of loyalty” owed by employees to their employers—a duty imposed vir-
tually unanimously by the courts of every state.2  Given the unique
status of corporate directors and officers—guardians of billions of dol-
lars of corporate assets—the extensive discourse on the nature of their
legal duties is eminently reasonable, if not imperative.  But given the
fact that the employee’s duty of loyalty embraces roughly 140 million
people,3 employee job mobility has never been higher, and the number
of lawsuits involving the duty has “mushroomed” in the last few
years,4 the concept deserves close scrutiny.  This article proposes the
at-will employee’s common law duty of loyalty fails the tests of reason
and fairness.  The bases for the duty appear too flimsy to justify the
burdens it imposes and the uncertainties it causes, and this duty,
therefore, has no legitimate role in today’s business environment.5
For the vast majority of the employees in the United States, their
employment relationship is “at-will.”6  This common law doctrine
means, as any law school graduate knows, the relationship can be ter-
minated by either the employer or employee at any time, for any rea-
son, or for no reason at all, with or without cause,7 and without prior
notice.  There are only limited exceptions: a termination that violates
a federal or state antidiscrimination statute or a “fundamental public
policy of the jurisdiction” is prohibited.8  Only such rare circumstances
J. CORP. L. 27 (2003); David S. Ruder, Duty of Loyalty—A Law Professor’s Status
Report, 40 BUS. LAW 1383 (1985).  The number of cases interpreting only Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 2000) (limiting personal liability for
certain breaches of fiduciary duty not including breach of the duty of loyalty)
gives some indication of the number of judicial ruminations on this issue
nationwide.
2. See infra section II.A.
3. The 2012 Statistical Abstract, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/com-
pendia/statab/ (last modified June 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
36EH-M5UG.
4. E.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519,
577–78 (2001).
5. Whether employees of nonprofits should be subject to a duty of loyalty is an issue
not addressed in this article, because just as the duties of the directors of non-
profit corporations may justifiably differ from those required in the for-profit
world, see Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Cor-
porate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Du-
ties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347 (2012), so, too, might those of the employees.
6. E.g., Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protections in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 108
(1997).  The alternative, of course, is a contractual relationship.
7. Only in the state of Montana must an employer have “cause” to terminate an at-
will employee. See Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-901 to -915 (1997).
8. ROGER LEROY MILLER, BUSINESS LAW TODAY: THE ESSENTIALS 516 (Erin Joyner et
al. eds., 10th ed. 2014).
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may give rise to a wrongful termination cause of action,9  and these
exceptions are “quite narrow and often difficult to prove.”10
The at-will doctrine has for many years been roundly criticized,11
though it also has strong advocates.12  Without becoming submerged
in the scholarship, these opposing positions can be summarized as fol-
lows: the “anti” position centers on the proposition that the doctrine is
harsh and unfair.  The employer exercises the termination power in-
herent in the at-will doctrine far more frequently than the employee,
and at the same time employees suffer far more from termination and
the threat of termination than the employer because employees are
simply more vulnerable than the employer.13  The proponents of the
doctrine rely primarily on economics: at-will employment is so widely
prevalent that it must be “market mimicking,”14 which means it is
efficient.  One of the market forces at work, theoretically, is that em-
ployment at-will reduces the cost of both firing and quitting because
either can be accomplished without the threat of litigation.15  From
the point of view of the employer, “[t]he flexibility afforded by the con-
tract at-will permits the ceaseless marginal adjustments that are nec-
essary in any ongoing productive activity conducted, as all activities
are, in conditions of technological and business change.”16  The em-
ployee benefits as well, in that she is free to leave rather than suc-
cumb to whatever “enormous demands” the employer could make if
the employee were subject to a fixed-term contract.17  Otherwise
stated, workers would demand a fixed-term contract if it were more
economically advantageous than at-will employment.18
9. Id.
10. Kim, supra note 6, at 107 n.9.
11. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2010) (footnote omitted) (“To be sure, for the last fifty years,
employment law scholars have evinced a near consensus that employment at
will—the American default rule that permits termination by either party for any
reason or no reason—ought to be abolished.”).
12. A seminal and widely-quoted advocacy article is Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of
the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984).
13. For references to and summaries of many of the scholarly articles on the subject,
see Arnow-Richman, supra note 11; Kim, supra note 6; Nicole B. Porter, The
Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Employment and Just
Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62 (2008).
14. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L.
REV. 205, 226, 271 (2001) (disputing also the “standard economic wisdom” under-
lying much of the debate about various aspects of employment law).
15. Epstein, supra note 12, at 966-67.
16. Id. at 982.
17. Id. at 966.
18. Id. Epstein’s argument is nuanced and complex.  This brief summary hardly does
it justice.  But because this article is not about economics and the law, and the
arguments presented here do not depend in any way on the relative economic
value of at-will versus contractual employment relationships, this passing refer-
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Whatever the relative merits to employers, employees, and the
public welfare of at-will employment compared to a contractual rela-
tionship, it is quite likely that at-will employment is here to stay.19
As the percentage of the unionized workforce continues to decline20
and worker mobility—inherent in the twenty-first century global
economy—continues to increase, the percentage of at-will employ-
ees—already the predominant employment relationship in this coun-
try—seems likely to increase.  Given these facts, it is imperative that
the at-will relationship be defined at law in such a way as to maximize
its benefits and minimize potential harms.
One of those harms is the employee’s vulnerability to the economic
disaster of suddenly losing a job.21  A number of “fixes” to the at-will
doctrine that could reduce the nature and extent of this particular
harm have been proposed,22 the most popular being some version of
the “just cause” limitation on an employer’s right to terminate.23  But
absent a wholesale judicial revision of the common law at-will doc-
trine, or legislative action, neither of which appears forthcoming,24
the unfettered right of the employer to terminate an employee—so
long as the reason is not specifically unlawful—will remain
unfettered.
ence to a significant body of scholarly research is intended solely to point the
reader to the literature that does address the economic issue in depth.
19. Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 4 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he likelihood of eco-
nomic-based termination is part and parcel of a modern, fast-paced, intercon-
nected economy that is constantly reinventing itself.  Given this reality, one
might think that the rights of workers terminated for economic reasons—
whether individually or collectively—would top employee advocates’ agenda for
legal reform.  But this is not the case.”).
20. According to a January, 2014 press release from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, the percentage of union workers in 2012 was 11.3%, a number representa-
tive of a continual decline over the last several decades. Union Members
Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
union2.nr0.htm (last modified Jan. 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
D8L8-K2W7.
21. See generally Arnow-Richman, supra note 11; Epstein, supra note 12, at 982
(“The strength of the contract at will should not be judged by the occasional cases
in which it is said to produce unfortunate results . . . .”); Porter, supra note 13, at
63 (“Losing one’s job has long been recognized as one of the most stressful and
traumatic experiences a person may ever endure.”); Clyde W. Summers, Employ-
ment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 65, 77–78 (2000).
22. Proponents of revisions to the at-will doctrine are typically aiming at a wider
spectrum of perceived problems with the at-will doctrine than sudden job termi-
nation, including, for example, terminations for unjust and unfair—though not
illegal—reasons.  But unexpected job loss is usually on the list of issues to be
remedied. See generally,  e.g., Porter, supra note 13.
23. Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 5.
24. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 21, at 78.
2014] AT-WILL FIDUCIARIES? 271
This article proposes a means of improving the at-will world for
employees—insofar as that world includes the threat of a sudden end
to one’s livelihood—that does not tamper with the “at-will-ness” of ter-
mination itself.  As discussed below, the employee’s common law duty
of loyalty prohibits an employee from, inter alia, competing with the
employer during the employment relationship, though he can “pre-
pare” to compete.  That distinction is a fine one, and arguably impossi-
ble to draw ex ante.25  Therefore, to the extent the duty of loyalty
deters employees from taking steps to prepare for a sudden termina-
tion for fear that those steps would later be deemed a breach of duty—
or penalizes employees who have successfully transitioned to a new
job but are then sued for breach of the duty of loyalty—eliminating
that duty for at-will employees will reduce the emotional and eco-
nomic toll of the at-will employment doctrine.26  In addition, because
the at-will employee’s duty of loyalty rests on a shaky jurisprudential
foundation and is unworkable, unfair, outdated, and unnecessary, it
should be abandoned.  In its place, an at-will employee should owe
only the duty of “good faith and fair dealing” derived from contract
law, which, in effect, would fill any hole left in the legal web defining
the employment relationship when the duty of loyalty is excised.
Part II provides an overview of the duty of loyalty as it is applied
by the courts in the various states.  Part III returns to various aspects
of the law regarding the duty of loyalty that are particularly ambigu-
ous, and argues the ambiguity infects the very validity of imposing a
duty of loyalty and renders it very difficult for employers and employ-
ees to understand and comply with the duty.  Part IV illustrates why
the jurisprudential provenance of the duty of loyalty—emanating from
the medieval doctrine of master and servant—understandably does
not map clearly onto the twenty-first century global employment mar-
ket.  Finally, Part V argues the duty of loyalty is not necessary to “pro-
tect” the employer from “bad” conduct on the part of the employee—
which is its essential function—and that if removing the duty of loy-
alty does pose any significant threat, requiring good faith and fair
dealing by the employee satisfactorily fills any perceived gaps.
25. See generally Scott W. Fielding, Free Competition or Corporate Theft? The Need
for Courts to Consider the Employment Relationship in Preliminary Steps Dis-
putes, 52 VAND. L. REV. 201, 205 (1999).
26. For several reasons, as is evident in the discussion in various parts of this Article,
it is reasonable to draw a distinction between at-will and contract employees in
regard to the imposition of a duty of loyalty.  Arguably, however, many of the
arguments made here against the duty of loyalty would apply as well to contract
employees, though this point is not further explored in this article.
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II. THE EMPLOYEE’S DUTY OF LOYALTY IN THE COURTS
All jurisdictions recognize the duty of loyalty in the employment
context.27  The duty of loyalty is a common law doctrine and, there-
fore, varies somewhat from state to state.  Nonetheless, in all states,
the doctrine has a similar contour, though the boundaries of that con-
tour are quite “fuzzy.”  Despite the hundreds, if not thousands of re-
ported cases implicating the duty of loyalty,28 several aspects of the
duty remain unsettled.  This uncertainty exists not only between
states, but also among the various courts of the same jurisdiction.29
This section provides an overview of the similarities and differences in
the case law on the origins of the employee’s duty of loyalty; to whom
it applies; what conduct it requires and prohibits; and the conse-
quences of a breach.  Three representative cases involving an alleged
breach of the duty are then described in some detail to render the con-
cepts more concrete.
A. Overview
The duty of loyalty finds its genesis in the law of agency.  By defini-
tion, agency is a fiduciary relationship: “Agency is the fiduciary rela-
tionship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to
another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests
assent or otherwise consents so to act.”30  It follows necessarily that
the agent/fiduciary owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty.  “An agent has a
fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters
connected with the agency relationship.”31  Because an employee is
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 note a (Preliminary Draft No. 7,
2010).
28. Citations in this article are to be representative and are not intended to be
inclusive.
29. Compare, e.g., Berry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 242 S.E.2d 551 (S.C. 1978)
(finding tire salesman who was fired by his employer after nineteen years be-
cause he worked for competitor while on sick leave was disloyal and not entitled
to severance pay), with Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 191 S.E.2d 761, 767–70
(S.C. 1972) (holding key employees who contacted and met with investors and a
customer of current employer to lay plans to start a competing textile company,
who left their employer without notice, and who leased space and ordered materi-
als to build manufacturing equipment were guilty of disloyalty and owed dam-
ages to employer).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006); see Ruesga v. Kindred Nursing
Ctrs. W., L.L.C., 161 P.3d 1253, 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006)); Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527,
535 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (same); Soults Farms, Inc. v. Schafer, 797 N.W.2d 92,
100 (Iowa 2011) (same).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006); Huong Que, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 535 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006)); Emerson Elec.
Co. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 362 S.W.3d 7, 13 (Mo. 2012) (same).
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traditionally deemed an agent of the employer, the employee owes a
duty of loyalty to the employer.32  This rule applies whether the em-
ployment relationship is contractual or at-will.33
Case law does not provide consistent or clear answers to several
questions regarding the nature and scope of the employee’s duty.  For
one, although the employee’s duty of loyalty derives from “fiduciary”
principles in the law of agency, it is uncertain whether all employees’
common law duty of loyalty rises to a fiduciary duty.34  Some courts
refer simply to a “duty of loyalty.”35  Many courts, without even exam-
ining the specifics of the relationship between the employee and the
employer, simply (and frequently slothfully) apply the “rule” that the
existence of an employment relationship per se casts a “fiduciary
32. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hoskins, No. 5:10cv087, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30770, at *15 (W.D. Va. March 7, 2012) (“An agency relationship, as in the
employer–employee relationship, creates a fiduciary duty on the part of the
agent, or employee, to the principal, or employer.”); Scanwell Freight Express
STL, Inc. v. Chan, 162 S.W.3d 477, 479 (Mo. 2005) (“[E]very employee owes his or
her employer a duty of loyalty.”); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.,
518 S.E.2d 591, 594 n.1 (S.C. 1999) (noting that the difference between an “agent”
and “employee” is often one “of degree” and that, in any event, the rules regarding
the duty of loyalty apply “with equal force to agents and ordinary employees”);
Williams v. Dominion Tech. Partners, L.L.C., 576 S.E.2d 752, 757 (Va. 2003) (“We
have long recognized that under the common law an employee, including an em-
ployee-at-will, owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to his employer during his
employment.”).
33. See, e.g., Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., L.P., 344 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir.
2003); St. Paul, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30770, at *15; Gustafson v. Full Serv.
Maint. Corp., No. 4:11CV00443AGF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27903, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. March 2, 2012) (applying Missouri law); Gross v. Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer & Feld, LLP, 599 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D.D.C. 2009); Draim v. Virtual Geo-
satellite Holdings, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 2d 32, 39 (D.D.C. 2009); Lucas v. United
Fabricating, Inc., No. 5:06CV154 (STAMP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64269, at *14
(N.D.W. Va. Aug. 29, 2007); Cent. Lewmar, L.P., v. Gentilin, No. 03-4671(JWB),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45902, at *9 (D.N.J. June 1, 2005); Bray v. Squires, 702
S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. App. 1985).
34. Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant? Reconciling Employment
Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777, 801 (2011) (“On
the core question of whether employees are per se fiduciaries, the law is more
than a little confused . . . .”).
35. E.g., Keystone Fruit Mktg., Inc. v. Brownfield, 352 F. App’x 169, 171 (9th Cir.
2009) (applying Washington law); Guidant Sales Corp. v. George, No. 05-2890
(PAM/JSM), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83008, at *12 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2006); Cent.
Lewmar, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45902, at *7; Diamond Phoenix Corp. v. Small,
No. 05-79-P-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12798, at *11 (D. Me. 2005) (holding alle-
gations of complaint insufficient to show fiduciary relationship or breach thereof,
but denying motion to dismiss on separate count for breach of  “duty of loyalty”);
Jet Courier Service, Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 492 n.10 (Colo. 1989); Futch, 518
S.E.2d at 594; Everbrite Electric Signs, Inc. v. Yezzi, 425 N.W.2d 39, at *1 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1988).
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duty” of loyalty on the employee.36  Many courts, however, tie the exis-
tence of a fiduciary duty to facts that demonstrate a “special confi-
dence” has been reposed in the employee at issue, or that she is a “key”
employee.37  These courts discern that employees without especial re-
sponsibilities—sometimes referenced as “mere employees”38—do not
necessarily have a fiduciary relationship with the employer and there-
fore may owe no fiduciary duty.39  These cases acknowledge the direc-
36. E.g., Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, Inc., 813 F.
Supp. 2d 489, 521–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying New York law); Nat’l R.R. Pas-
senger Corp. v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 86, 94 (D.D.C. 2009)
(“Generally, fiduciary principles are applicable to employees.”); Las Luminarias
of the N.M. Council of the Blind v. Isengard, 587 P.2d 444, 449 (N.M. 1978) (“It is
well settled that the employment relationship is one of trust and confidence and
places upon the employee a duty to use his best efforts on behalf of his em-
ployer.”); Bray, 702 S.W.2d at 270.
37. ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402
F.3d 700, 716 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that the district court improperly granted
summary judgment to employee defendants solely because it did not need to con-
sider the employees’ “alleged positions of trust and access to confidential informa-
tion” on the grounds that salespeople cannot owe fiduciary duties to an
employer); Talentburst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265–67 (D.
Mass. 2008) (finding employee–employer fiduciary duties depends on an evalua-
tion of whether the employee held “positions of trust and confidence” (emphasis
omitted)); Chelsea Indus., Inc. v. Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 320, 326 (Mass. 1983)
(“Employees occupying a position of trust and confidence owe a duty of loyalty to
their employer and must protect the interests of the employer.”); W. Blue Print
Co., LLC v. Roberts, No. WD72025, 2011 Mo. App. LEXIS 606, at *21 (Mo. Ct.
App. April 29, 2011) (holding all employees owe a duty of loyalty, but the employ-
ment relationship does not per se create a fiduciary relationship); Burbank
Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 796 (Wis. 2006) (“If the em-
ployee is a key employee, then a fiduciary duty of loyalty will exist.”  (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also 19 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS § 54:26 (4th ed. 2001) (“[T]he employer–employee relationship is not one
from which the law will necessarily imply a fiduciary duty in every case.”).
38. E.g., Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Sinibaldi, 821 F. Supp. 232, 254 (D. Del.
1992) (quoting Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. Ch. 1949)) (applying
Delaware law).
39. E.g., Calkins v. IPD Analytics, L.L.C., No. 08-23188-CIV-MORENO/TORRES,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85702, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2009) (rejecting the argu-
ment that every employee–employer relationship amounts to that of principal
and agent and gives rise to fiduciary duties); Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 611 N.E.2d
1054, 1059 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding officers owe fiduciary duty while employ-
ees are merely prohibited from engaging in “demonstrable business activity” in
competition with their employer); cf., e.g., Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d
921, 934–35 (Cal. 1966) (holding duty of loyalty applies to corporate officers); Md.
Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, A.2d 564, 568 (Md. 1978) (holding duty of loyalty applies
to a “corporate officer or other high-echelon employee”); Chelsea, 449 N.E.2d at
326–27 (holding duty of loyalty applies to “corporate officer, director, or trusted
agent or employee”).
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tor of a public corporation may owe a different kind of duty to the
corporation than, say, a custodian.40
In some jurisdictions the distinction drawn between “fiduciaries”
and other employees results in a distinction between the nature of the
duty each owes: all employees owe a duty of loyalty, but the obliga-
tions imposed by the duty are “more rigorous” for an employee in a
fiduciary position of “special confidence” than are those imposed by
the common law duty of loyalty.41  In others, the distinction leads to
the conclusion that a cause of action lies for a breach of a fiduciary
duty—should one be justified given the particularly “trustworthy” na-
ture of the employer–employee relationship at issue—but not for
breach of the common law duty of loyalty.42  But in those jurisdictions
in which the duty of loyalty does not give rise to a separate cause of
action, the employee nonetheless bears the obligation to act loyally to-
ward the employer.43  At least, no court has specifically held that an
employee does not owe a common law duty of loyalty.44
40. See ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc.,
402 F.3d 700, 716 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment to employee defendants solely because it did not
need to consider the employees’ “alleged positions of trust and access to confiden-
tial information” on the grounds that salespeople cannot owe fiduciary duties to
an employer).
41. E.g., Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201, 1211 (10th Cir. 2007) (apply-
ing Texas law) (“[T]he fiduciary relationship establishes a distinct and separate
obligation than the duty of loyalty to an employer . . . .  The fiduciary duty exists
because of the ‘peculiar’ trust between the employee-agent and his employer-prin-
cipal.  Thus, the bonds created by a fiduciary relationship are stronger and the
obligations are correspondingly more rigorous than those ascribed to the duty of
loyalty.” (citation omitted)); Gustafson v. Full Serv. Maint. Corp., No.
4:11CV00443AGF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27903, at *5 (E.D. Mo. March 2, 2012)
(finding, in Missouri, the duty of loyalty precludes the employee from competing
with the employer but fiduciaries must act with “utmost good faith”); Cameco,
Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 789 (N.J. 1999) (“The scope of the duty of loyalty
that an employee owes to an employer may vary with the nature of their relation-
ship.  Employees occupying a position of trust and confidence, for example, owe a
higher duty than those performing low-level tasks.”).
42. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., No. CV 04-9049 DOC (RNBx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55756, *16–22 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Talentburst, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 265–67
(no independent claim if no fiduciary duty); Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704,
708–09 (N.C. 2001); see generally Condon Auto Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Crick, 604
N.W.2d 587, 600 (Iowa 1999) and cases cited therein.
43. Condon, 604 N.W.2d at 598 (“We recognize the existence of a common law duty of
loyalty which is implied in employment relationships.”); see Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at
709 (finding a breach of the common law duty of loyalty, though not a separate
claim, is a defense to a wrongful termination action).
44. E.g., Mattel, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55756, at *12 (applying California law, the
court stated, “non-fiduciary employees owe no duty of loyalty to their employers,”
but held that no cause of action for breach of a duty of loyalty lays separate and
apart from the claim of breach of fiduciary duty).
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Courts often note that the scope of this “duty of loyalty”—be it
owed by an employee-fiduciary or an “ordinary” employee—is “often
blurred at the edges.”45  Blurry, too, is the distinction between what a
fiduciary must do to act loyally and what a “mere” employee must do,
or refrain from doing.  That is, despite the language in many cases
defining a fiduciary employee’s duty as being more “rigorous” than
other employees,46 or contrasting the offending employee’s conduct
with the “punctilio” required of a fiduciary, in no reported case has the
court explicitly found activities that would be disloyal if undertaken
by a fiduciary employee would nonetheless be “loyal” enough if con-
ducted by an ordinary employee.47  As noted above, the consequences
of breaching the duty may be different and a jury may well weigh the
situation differently if it decides, based on the instructions given, that
the employee was a fiduciary.  But as a general matter, the types of
conduct that can constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty seem to be
the same for any employee.48
Though the obligations imposed by the duty of loyalty cannot be
described with precision, certain overarching rules are fairly definite.
First, the duty of loyalty imposes obligations on the employee that are
separate and apart from the duty to perform the job.49  An employee
can perform up to, or even exceed, job expectations and nonetheless
breach the duty of loyalty.  Second, the common law duty of employees
is confined to “all matters connected with the agency,”50 which in the
employment context translates into the scope of employment.  Third,
an employee is prohibited from competing with the employer while
employed,51 though case law seems unanimous that an employee may
45. Aon Risk Servs., Inc. v. Liebenstein, 710 N.W.2d 175, 190 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2005)
(“key employees” owe a fiduciary duty), abrogated on other grounds by Burbank
Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2006).
46. Rash, 498 F.3d at 1211.
47. See Gustafson v. Full Serv. Maint. Corp., No. 4:11CV00443AGF, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27903, at *6 (E.D. Mo. March 2, 2012) (holding the employee’s alleged
“dishonest and insubordinate” behavior was insufficient to show a breach of the
duty of loyalty, but not reaching the issue of whether the alleged conduct would
have sustained the claim had she been a fiduciary).
48. E.g., Benchmark Med. Holdings, Inc. v. Rehab Solutions, LLC, 307 F. Supp. 2d
1249, 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (applying Delaware law) (holding that whether or
not an employee is a fiduciary, he or she can still be liable, as an agent, for breach
of the duty of loyalty for “wrongful appropriation” of a corporate opportunity).
49. Leslie Larkin Cooney, Employee Fiduciary Duties: One Size Does Not Fit All, 79
MISS. L.J. 853, 858 (2010).
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
51. E.g., Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Riley, 338 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying
Hawaii law); Think Vacuums, Inc. v. March, No. 09-61883-CIV-COOKE/BAND-
STRA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12558, at *6 (S.D. Fla. February 9, 2011); Guidant
Sales Corp. v. George, No. 05-2890 (PAM/JSM), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83008, at
*12 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2006).
2014] AT-WILL FIDUCIARIES? 277
“prepare to compete” by taking steps to form a new company52 or mak-
ing initial contact with potential customers, for example.53  Finally,
employees are prohibited from disclosing or using confidential infor-
mation, appropriating the property (including customer lists) of the
employer, or engaging in self-dealing through use of the employee’s
position with the employer.54
These specific prohibitions are merely the tip of the iceberg in
terms of the restraints on employee behavior imposed by the duty of
loyalty—at least conceptually.  The duty is violated when an em-
ployee’s actions are “inconsistent with promoting the best interest of
their employer at a time when they were on its payroll,”55 or when the
employee acts in a manner “contrary to the employer’s interest.”56
Two ABC reporters, who attained part-time jobs at a Food Lion, Inc.,
violated the duty of loyalty by secretly videotaping allegedly unwhole-
some food handling practices, which then aired on an ABC broad-
cast.57  The duty “arguably extends to harmful speech,
insubordination, neglect, disruption of employee/employer relations,
or discrediting the employer’s name, product or reputation.”58  The
employee’s common law duty of loyalty is theoretically not as “mono-
lithic” as that imposed on corporate directors and officers,59 but aside,
perhaps, from the limited right to “prepare to compete” while em-
ployed, the doctrine as stated and applied appears very close to the
“self-abnegation” expected, at least by some commentators, of direc-
tors and officers.60
52. E.g., Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 611 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(“[E]mployees may plan, form, and outfit a competing corporation while still
working for the employer, but not commence competition.”); Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 518 S.E.2d 591, 597 (S.C. 1999).
53. E.g., Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. App. 1985).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 7,
2010).
55. Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 191 S.E.2d 761, 767 (S.C. 1972).
56. Cent. Lewmar, L.P. v. Gentilin, No. 03-4671(JWB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45902,
at *7 (D.N.J. June 1, 2005) (applying New Jersey law); see also Hilb, Rogal &
Hamilton Co. of Richmond v. DePew, 440 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1994) (stating that a
breach occurs when the conduct is “adverse” to the employer’s interest).
57. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying
North Carolina law) (affirming jury verdict that there had been a violation of the
duty of loyalty). But see Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 709 (N.C. 2001) (re-
jecting Food Lion to the extent that North Carolina does not recognize an inde-
pendent claim for breach of the common law duty of loyalty, absent any fiduciary
relationship, but not on the grounds that the reporters’ conduct complied with the
duty of loyalty).
58. Cooney, supra note 49, at 859 (footnotes omitted).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (2006).
60. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 903 (2011); see
also Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 776 (2000) (“[F]iduciary law’s loyalty obligation requires
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An employee can be discharged,61 disciplined, reprimanded, or lose
wages for the period of disloyalty for breaching the duty of loyalty.62
If the employee is a fiduciary—and in those jurisdictions in which a
separate claim is allowed for a “simple” breach of the duty of loyalty—
the employer can seek “ordinary” or compensatory damages caused by
the breach.63  An employer may also seek “disgorgement.”  That is, if
an agent receives anything as a result of his violation of a duty of loy-
alty to the principal, he is subject to a liability to deliver it, its value,
or its proceeds, to the principal.64  An employer may seek to disgorge
the profit earned by the disloyal employee or the profit the employer
would have earned had the employee not been disloyal.65  In some ju-
risdictions, the employer is entitled to seek disgorgement even if it has
not suffered any actual injury.66  An employer may obtain injunctive
that one party completely subordinate self-interest and act exclusively for the
benefit of the other party.”).
61. E.g., Berry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 242 S.E.2d 551, 552 (S.C. 1978).
62. E.g., Food Lion, 193 F.3d at 515; Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284,
301–02 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that appropriate damages for employee’s breach of
fiduciary duty is limited to employee’s salary for period of disloyalty); see Sulli-
van, supra note 34, at 807; see also PM Servs. Co. v. Odoi Assocs., Inc., No. 03-
1810 (CKK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 655, at *117 (D.D.C. January 4, 2006) (“[N]o
compensation is owed an employee who has breached his duty of loyalty . . . .”
(quoting Riggs Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 966 F.Supp. 1250, 1266 (2006)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 518 S.E.2d
591 (S.C. 1999) (an employee is not entitled to receive compensation during the
period it breached its duty of loyalty).
63. E.g., Everbrite Electric Signs, Inc. v. Yezzi, 425 N.W.2d 39 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (1958); see, e.g., Radio TV Reports, Inc.
v. Ingersoll, 742 F. Supp. 19, 22 n.6 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing Miller Bldg. Supply, Inc.
v. Rosen, 503 A.2d 1344, 1348 (Md. 1986)).
65. Everbrite, 425 N.W.2d 39, at *1; Cooney, supra note 49, at 866; see generally Sul-
livan, supra note 34 (employees must “disgorge the compensation paid during the
period of faithlessness”).
66. E.g., Jet Courier Service, Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 497 (Colo. 1989) (soliciting
coworkers to leave to work for competing company need not be successful to con-
stitute breach because no harm need be shown); ABC Trans Nat’l Transp., Inc. v.
Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1314–15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(holding that it is misconduct itself that is wrongful and “it makes no difference
whether the result of an [employee’s] conduct is injurious to the [employer]”);
Everbrite, 425 N.W.2d 39; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 cmt. a (1958)
(agent breaches duty of loyalty by acting in competition with principal even
though agent’s conduct does not harm principal); see Sullivan, supra note 34, at
779–80 (“The net result [of the alternatives to compensatory damage available for
breach of the duty of loyalty] is that an employer can recover substantial amounts
of compensation otherwise due without proof that it suffered any damage whatso-
ever and, indeed, even if it is established that there were no such damages.”); see
also News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis, 862 A.2d 837, 843 (Conn. App. Ct.
2004) (holding that an employer cannot recover for breach of the duty of loyalty
as a tort action absent a showing of injury, though it can recover compensation
paid to a disloyal employee if it can prove the monetary amount paid).
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relief against a disloyal former employee.67  Often the “disloyalty” at
issue involves third parties—a new employer, for example—and, de-
pending on the facts involved, those third parties can be sued for com-
pensatory damages or disgorgement for aiding and abetting the
breach of duty.68
B. Representative Cases
The following three cases, in all of which the employer’s claim of
breach survived a motion for summary judgment, are representative
of the factual outline common to many duty of loyalty cases.  Though
every case is unique in many regards, many arise from the same basic
situation: an employee terminates employment, and the ex-employer
alleges the employee did something in breach of the duty before end-
ing the relationship.  As discussed above, the employer may claim, in-
ter alia, that as a consequence of the alleged breach the employee
cannot collect salary or other compensation that would otherwise be
owed or that the employee and a third party—the new employer or the
employee’s newly-established company, for example—owe damages,
disgorgement of profits, or other remedial measures.  Though these
cases have the same basic factual skeleton and involve an at-will em-
ployment relationship, they arise from very different industries: high-
tech, personal fitness, passenger railway service.  The cases also, ar-
guably, differ significantly in terms of their rank on the disloyalty
spectrum, insofar as “loyalty” means some affirmative moral obliga-
tion arising from a special relationship69 instead of a colorless legal
construct.  Thus, these cases are intended to illustrate a cross-section
of the duty of loyalty cases, which will be used to anchor the discussion
in the succeeding sections.
In Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, the co-defendant, Chang,
worked as an associate in the B&P law firm. 70  The employment rela-
tionship was at-will. 71  Mr. Chang had a friend, Henry King, whose
father and other members of a Chinese delegation were injured in a
helicopter crash. 72  Chang assisted King in finding an attorney to sue
67. See, e.g., Inner-Tite Corp. v. Brozowski, No. 2010-0156, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS
159, at *70–71 (Mass. Super. Ct. April 14, 2010) (granting one year-long perma-
nent injunction that restrained and enjoined defendant from engaging in plain-
tiff’s industry, interacting with plaintiff’s customers and sales representatives in
the defendant’s former geographic region, or utilizing or disclosing plaintiff’s con-
fidential or proprietary information).
68. E.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 86
(D.D.C. 2009) (new employer sued for aiding and abetting breach of duty); News
Am. Mktg., 862 A.2d 837 (same).
69. See generally Johnson, supra note 1.
70. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 7 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex. App. 1999).
71. Id. at 867.
72. Id. at 864.
280 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:267
to recover for his father’s injuries.73  Chang met with partners at B&P
and told them he could “sign up” the client because of his fluency in
Mandarin.74  The firm was “definitely interested” in the case.75
Chang and a partner discussed candidates for referring the case—
which would be a significant business opportunity for the firm—and
fee sharing arrangements.76  Chang then “shopped” the case around
to several other lawyers, and King ultimately signed a retainer with
Johnson, who referred the case to noted personal injury lawyer Joe
Jamail.77  Jamail ultimately settled the case for $15,000,000.78  John-
son received a $3,000,000 referral fee.79  When Chang’s partner heard
Jamail had the case, he asked Chang how it happened, and Chang
said it must have been because Jamail was very famous.80
Shortly after these incidents Chang left the firm.81  B&P then sued
him for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, and Johnson for civil con-
spiracy.82  Applying Texas law, the trial court granted Chang’s motion
for summary judgment in which Chang argued that as an at-will em-
ployee he owed no fiduciary duty to B&P.83  The court of appeals re-
versed.  Extending precedent that a fiduciary duty is owed when the
employment relationship is based on an oral understanding, though
not a written contract, the court ruled that the relationship of an asso-
ciate to the firm and its members, whether the associate be an at-will
employee or not, is a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law.84
Whether the duty had been breached and caused damage would be for
the jury to decide.85
In Taser International, Inc. v. Ward, the defendant, Steve Ward,
worked for three years as an at-will employee with Taser, the Arizona
company famous for its “stun gun.”86  Taser also manufactures acces-
sories for electronic control devices.87  During his employment, Ward
73. Id.
74. Id. at 865.
75. Id. at 864.
76. Id. at 864–65.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 864.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 865.
81. Id. at 866.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 867–68.
85. Id. at 868.  In the defendants’ summary judgment motion, they claimed, inter
alia, that Chang breached no duty if it was owed because he received no portion
of the fee for the case and the helicopter crash victim made his own choice of
attorney, such that nothing Chang did or did not do caused any harm. Id. at
871–72.  The court did not reach these arguments.
86. Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Ward, 231 P.3d 921, 923 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
87. Id.
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developed a design for an eyeglass mounted camera device.88  Because
he served as vice-president of marketing and international sales and
had access to confidential and proprietary information, including new
product ideas, Ward had sought advice of counsel as to whether he
could develop the clip-on camera independently of his employer.89
Before he left Taser, Ward worked with a separate product develop-
ment company, received a development proposal from that company
for the new camera device, and drafted a business plan for commer-
cializing the product.90  He did not, however, “solicit or recruit any
Taser employees, distributors, customers, or vendors; he did not buy,
sell, or incorporate any business; he did not acquire office space or
other general business services; he did not contact or enter into any
agreements with suppliers or manufacturers for his proposed clip-on
camera; and he did not sell any products.”91  After leaving Taser,
Ward established his own company and began marketing the clip-on
camera to consumers and law enforcement personnel.92  Ten months
after Ward resigned, Taser announced its new “AXON” device, a “state
of the art audio-video earpiece with imager, speaker, and microphone
[that] integrates into the communication loop between existing radios
and the [officer’s] communications headset.”93
Taser then sued Ward, claiming, inter alia, breach of the duty of
loyalty.94  On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court
granted judgment for Taser.95  The court of appeals reversed.  The ap-
pellate court agreed that, as an employer, Ward owed Taser the “fidu-
ciary duty” required of an agent, so that Ward was obligated “to act
with entire good faith and loyalty for the furtherance of the interests
of his principal in all matters concerning or affecting the subject of his
agency” or pay Taser for any loss occasioned by the failure to so act.96
Specifically, while employed by Taser, Ward could not compete with
Taser, though he could prepare to compete.97  In reviewing the facts of
record, the court noted that Taser did not claim Ward’s product com-
peted with the AXON, and that there was a dispute as to whether
88. Id. at 924.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 927.
92. Id. at 924.
93. Id. at 924 n.5.
94. Taser also alleged tortious interference with contract, breach of contract, conver-
sion, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 924.  The relationship of these claims and
others is often asserted in addition to breach of the duty of loyalty—misappropri-
ation of trade secrets, copyright, and patent infringement being among them—is
discussed infra Part V.
95. Id. at 925.
96. Taser, 231 P.3d at 926.
97. Id.
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Taser even had a competing product in the design stage.98  But it sent
the case back to the jury, nonetheless, to decide whether Ward had
engaged in “preliminary” or “substantial” design and development of
his clip-on camera.  The former would be acceptable, but the latter in
breach of the duty of loyalty.99
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Veolia Transportation
Services, Inc., plaintiff (Amtrak) sued the successful bidder for a con-
tract to operate a commuter rail service in a competitive procurement
by the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (SFRTA), the
commuter service between Miami and Palm Beach.100  Amtrak al-
leged, inter alia, that Veolia aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary
duty by three former Amtrak employees.101  The alleged breach oc-
curred when three at-will Amtrak employees allowed Veolia to iden-
tify them as putative members of the “key management team” for the
Florida rail service should Veolia win the contract award: Veolia made
the Amtrak employees contingent offers of employment, meaning they
would only come to work for Veolia if Veolia won the competitive
procurement.102
On cross motions for summary judgment, Veolia argued, inter alia,
that if any duty were owed it did not extend to the SFRTA procure-
ment because that procurement was outside the employees’ scope of
employment, given that the Amtrak employees had no job responsibil-
ities for business development, no responsibilities for South Florida,
and no responsibilities for the SFRTA procurement.103  Because an
agent owes a fiduciary duty to the principal; an agent is one who acts
for and under the control of the principal; and an “employee” acts for
and under the control of the employer, the court indiscriminately held,
“fiduciary principles are applicable to employees.”104  Further, “em-
ployees—especially managers, corporate officers, and directors—owe
an undivided and unselfish loyalty to [their corporate employers,]
such that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-inter-
98. Id. at 928.
99. Id. Taser also alleged that Ward violated his fiduciary duty by failing to notify
Taser that he was planning to form a competing business. Id. at 931.  Accord-
ingly, the court applied the rule that the employee is not obligated to notify the
employer of preparations to compete, but must notify if he is actually competing;
and because the facts were disputed as to whether Ward was competing or pre-
paring to compete, this claim would also have to be decided by a jury. Id. at
931–32.
100. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37
(D.D.C. 2011).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 38–39.
103. Id. at 44.
104. Id. at 47.
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est . . . .”105  At least “managers,” then, owe a “general duty of loy-
alty.”106  And because the Amtrak employees were deemed to be at
some undefined level of management (each supervised at least some-
one), the court held that they owed such a duty to their employer.107
Whether that general duty had been breached would be a question for
the jury.108
III. A RIDDLE WRAPPED IN A MYSTERY INSIDE
AN ENIGMA109
It is argued here that the duty of loyalty imposed on at-will em-
ployee rests on a very shaky jurisprudential foundation that can read-
ily be dismantled.  Among the reasons for undertaking that task are
that the current rules defining who owes exactly what to whom are so
amorphous—if not just plain meaningless—that the entire doctrine
flunks one of the basic tenets of a just legal system: that the law can
be understood and obeyed and the consequences of disobedience are
reasonably clear.
A. The Riddle—The At-Will Employee as Fiduciary?
In an agency relationship, by definition, the agent owes a fiduciary
duty to the principal.110  The universal justification for imposing a le-
gal duty of loyalty on employees is that they are ordinarily deemed
“agents” of the employer because, like agents, employees work for and
under the control of the employer.  Thus, as an agent owes a fiduciary
duty to the principal, by definition, so, too, must an employee.111
On its face, this conclusion may seem logical and unassailable.
The formula mimics a Euclidean principle (the transitive theorem),
according to which two things that are both equal to a third thing
must equal each other (if A equals B, and B equals C, then A must
equal C).  Employees and agents are “equal” in that both work for and
105. Id. (quoting Gov’t Relations, Inc. v. Howe, No. 05-1081, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4952 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 48.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 50–51.  Veolia ultimately prevailed after a two-week jury trial.
109. This is, of course, Churchill’s evocative description of Russia.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (“Agency is the fiduciary relationship
that arises when one person . . . manifests assent to another person . . . that the
agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and
the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).  Not everyone ad-
heres completely to the dictates of the Restatement, of course. See Ribstein,
supra note 60, at 903 (“In short, a fiduciary relationship necessarily is an agency
relationship but an agency relationship is not necessarily a fiduciary
relationship.”).
111. See supra section II.A.  The duty is variously deemed fiduciary, general, or simply
a duty of loyalty.  This Article returns to this distinction below.
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under the control of another: the employer and principal, respectively.
Therefore, employees and agents must be “equal” to each other in re-
gard to the nature of the duty owed.  But law is not mathematics.  Em-
ployment law and agency law do not map perfectly onto each other in
several respects.  A non-employee agent is not, for example, protected
by Title VII.  A principal is not obligated by the Internal Revenue
Code to withhold income taxes from compensation paid a non-em-
ployee agent, nor pay into a workers’ compensation fund.  It does not
necessarily follow, then, that just because an employee is ordinarily
subject to some degree of control by the employer that employee must
owe a fiduciary duty to the employer.
Indeed, focusing on the question of whether an employee is a “fidu-
ciary,” instead of whether the employee is an “agent,” leads to the op-
posite conclusion, at least if the employee is at will.  According to the
classic definition, two elements must be present to create a fiduciary
relationship.  First, one party, the “entrustor,” designates a second
party to serve as a substitute for the entrustor.112  Not just any “sub-
stitution” fits this criterion.  A homeowner does not create a fiduciary
relationship by engaging a roofer rather than roof the house himself.
Instead, in the words of the courts, the substituted function should
implicate the imposition of some special “trust or confidence” in the
second party.113  But this action alone does not render the second
party a true fiduciary.  Only if the entrustor also cedes power, as well
as function, to the second party is a fiduciary relationship created.114
Thus, shareholders cede both trust and power to corporate officers and
directors; trust beneficiaries cede both trust and power to the trustee.
It is that very relinquishment of control that poses a risk of abuse
by the second party.  And it is that risk the special obligations imposed
on a fiduciary are intended to eliminate or reduce.115  Absent that re-
linquishment of control, the first party has other, adequate means of
protecting against abuse,116 and the special rules regarding fiducia-
112. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 808 (1983).
113. See Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Sinibaldi, 821 F. Supp. 232, 254 (D. Del.
1992) (applying Delaware law).
114. Frankel, supra note 112, at 809 (“[W]hile the fiduciary must be entrusted with
the power in order to perform his function, his possession of the power creates a
risk that he will misuse it and injure the entrustor.”); Ribstein, supra note 60, at
901 (“[M]y definition focuses on the particular type of entrustment that arises
from a property owner’s delegation to a manager of open-ended management
power over property without corresponding economic rights.”).
115. Ribstein, supra note 60, at 901 (“As in all economic agency relationships, the sep-
aration of control and economic ownership gives the manager or fiduciary an in-
centive to use her control to enrich herself rather than the property owner.”).
116. These non-fiduciary, duty-based means of control include financial incentives, the
unfettered power to terminate the relationship, contractual limitations, direct
oversight, control of performance, and monitoring, for example. See Frankel,
supra note 112, at 812–15.
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ries are unnecessary and, indeed, overly onerous.117  Otherwise
stated, “[i]f the entrustor can protect himself from abuse of power,
there is no need for the intervention of fiduciary law.”118
Thus, the quintessential fiduciaries—trustees and corporate direc-
tors—have been entrusted exclusive power to manage and control as-
sets owned by others.  The entrustors, on the other hand—
beneficiaries and shareholders—have few or inadequate remedies, ab-
sent the imposition of a fiduciary duty.  Fiduciary law is intended to
protect the entrustors in the event the trustee or director takes advan-
tage of her position of power to enrich herself at the expense of the
entrustors, or simply does a poor job of managing the assets.119
This scenario is a far cry from the at-will employment relationship.
In fact, the employment relationship is the mirror-image of the fiduci-
ary relationship.  The party wielding the power and control is the em-
ployer, yet it is the employee who owes the so-called fiduciary duty.  In
the world of trusts, the comparable rule would be that the beneficiary
owes the fiduciary duty; and in the corporate world, the shareholders
owe a fiduciary duty to the directors.  Certainly, an employee could be
granted such a significant amount of discretion and authority that she
wields a significant amount of power and control over the employment
relationship or the business as a whole.  But as another scholar has
concluded, “[i]t is not intuitively obvious that the employer is the vul-
nerable party in the employer-employee relationship.”120  At the bot-
tom, whether or not the employer exerts its power and control over an
at-will employee, because it has the authority to terminate the em-
ployee at any time and for any reason, its potential control over the
relationship is virtually absolute.121
To the contrary, it could be argued that the employer is vulnerable
because an employee in an at-will relationship can terminate at any
117. See Ribstein, supra note 60, at 903 (“The strictness of the fiduciary duty helps
explain its limited scope.  A duty of self-abnegation is only rarely appropriate in a
competitive marketplace.  Such a duty is usually excessively costly when applied
to commercial dealings because it undermines the incentives that motivate busi-
ness people to provide high-quality goods and services.”).
118. Frankel, supra note 112, at 811.
119. For example, as Ribstein notes, in a non-fiduciary relationship, the parties can
impose contractual limitations on the exercise of control that are enforceable
through standard breach of contact remedies.  But “parties in the limited cate-
gory of relationships involving open-ended delegation of power cannot contract to
limit the manager’s power without undermining the beneficiary’s objective in del-
egating power.  This makes an additional fiduciary duty appropriate.”  Ribstein,
supra note 60, at 904.
120. Terry A. O’Neill, Employees’ Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency De-
bate, 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 701 (1993).
121. See Frankel, supra note 112, at 810 (contrasting the power of a director to abuse
the entrustment of power by shareholders to the powerlessness of employees, who
“are usually expected to act only under the employer’s control”).
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time.  Thus, the employer is always at the risk of losing a valuable
employee suddenly and without notice, with subsequent damage to
the business—perhaps irreparable.  In a buyer’s market, as in the cur-
rent economy, this risk might be small.  But for some businesses or
industries, and in a different economic climate, the sudden departure
of one or more employees could well injure the employer.  The imposi-
tion of a fiduciary duty on the employee may well minimize that risk.
By preventing the employee from facilitating a quick departure by
making substantial preparations to leave, for example, an employee
may be deterred from making the attempt at all.122  But under these
circumstances, the employer retains its unfettered right to terminate
while the employee’s right to depart has been circumscribed.  Thus, by
thrusting the employee into a fiduciary role, the “balanced” nature of
the at-will relationship has been altered—only to the benefit of the
employer.  To the extent that an at-will employee has any fiduciary
characteristics, then, one might still question whether it is fair, rea-
sonable, or necessary to distort the at-will employment relationship by
importing one-sided fiduciary duty into that relationship.
The assertion that imposing a fiduciary duty on the employee is
unnecessary is discussed in detail in Part V.  But, to summarize, the
employer, unlike the typical entrustor, has a full quiver of tools to de-
ter and punish “abusive” behavior on the part of the employee, in addi-
tion to the power to terminate the relationship in its entirety.  For
example, many, if not most, employees simply need the job, which is in
itself a powerful incentive to respect the employment relationship.123
This situation is unlike the typical fiduciary, such as a corporate direc-
tor whose directorship is adjunct to his ability to make a living and
whose performance may therefore need the enhancement of the duties
imposed by fiduciary law.  Should there be any threat or perceived
threat of “disloyal” behavior, the employer can tighten its control over
the employee, reduce his responsibilities, monitor his laptop and
122. See O’Neill, supra note 120, at 698 (“Thus, employers can avail themselves of the
employee’s duty of loyalty defensively, to prevent an employee from raiding its
customers and other workers, or offensively, to punish the employee for taking
another job or to deter others from joining him.  In either case, this mandatory
rule of law gives employers a powerful tool to counteract labor market forces that
pose a threat to them.”); see also Fielding, supra note 25, at 206 (“Prohibiting
preliminary arrangements also raises fairness concerns because the rule places
employees trying to start their own business at a competitive disadvantage.  Most
entrepreneurs have the ability to contact key players and even attempt to solicit
their business before investing substantial funds into the venture.”).  To the ex-
tent employees are aware of the rules, the specter of starting at a “competitive
disadvantage” may well discourage the attempt.
123. See O’Neill, supra note 120, at 710 (“Taken together, employees’ lack of diversifi-
cation and their expectation of long-term employment make them vulnerable to
their employers in ways that others who provide services for compensation are
not.”).
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cellphone, reduce his pay, and, if none of that works, fire him.124
Should there be any threat or perceived risk from the employee’s sud-
den termination of employment, the employer can simply offer a fixed-
term contract.  It would seem that the employer is well-able to protect
itself, which calls into question the need for the additional control im-
posed by a “fiduciary” duty of loyalty.
For example, the role of Mr. Chang, the at-will associate in a law
firm, to the partners and firm—as opposed to his relationship with a
client, which is subject to very different considerations125—seems lit-
tle akin to a fiduciary relationship.  The typical associate is completely
at the beck and call of the partners, and, having no or few clients of his
own, completely dependent on the partners and the firm for financial
remuneration.  The market is crowded and he may have few, if any,
options should he be terminated.  Additionally, he is often in need of
training by the partners in order to be fully qualified to represent cli-
ents and move out on his own.  The power, particularly in an at-will
relationship, rests almost exclusively with the partners and firm, not
the associate.  He is entrusted with client matters, but he is obligated
by the rules of professional responsibility to provide “zealous” repre-
sentation, maintain confidentiality, and otherwise comport himself in
a “loyal” fashion insofar as the business of the firm is concerned.
Should the firm be concerned about associates referring cases to other
attorneys or firms, the firm can readily adopt clear policies prohibiting
this conduct and punish any offender by reducing wages or salary, de-
moting, or firing.  But perhaps if the firm has not inspired confidence
in its associates that it is the best firm for the potential referral, it
doesn’t deserve that referral.
Mr. Ward is arguably closer to the fiduciary model, but not by
much.  Though Ward was a vice-president of marketing and partici-
pated in “high level executive meetings” at Taser,126 there is no indi-
cation in the decisions that he held any significant power in the
employment relationship.  Mr. Ward just did his job, and apparently
did it well.127
The Amtrak employees were even lower than Mr. Ward on the “fi-
duciary” scale.  Although they all managed or trained someone, they
were far below the Amtrak executive level.  One ran a train between
124. See Sullivan, supra note 34, at 786 (“In most cases, at least where a collective-
bargaining agreement is not involved, the employer’s self-help remedy of dis-
charging an at-will employee provides effective and cost-efficient relief for any
perceived dereliction of duty—and without having to establish either the exis-
tence of the duty or its actual breach.”).
125. Why the attorney–client relationship does fit within the paradigm of a fiduciary
relationship is beyond the scope of this article.
126. Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Ward, 231 P.3d 921, 927 n.11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
127. Taser presented no evidence in its case against Mr. Ward that he “was derelict”
in his job performance. Id. at 926 n.9.
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Portland, Maine and Boston; one ran the station in Albuquerque; and
one trained others in safety.  None had been imparted with any “spe-
cial trust” by Amtrak in regard to business development, government
procurements, or the SFRTA procurement in any regard.  The only
particular “power” these employees had vis-a`-vis Amtrak was to fail to
do their job or walk off the job, with potentially damaging conse-
quences to minor aspects of Amtrak’s day-to-day operations.  Neither
of these employee options smacks of the “power” a corporate director
or trustee has over the fundamental operations of a business.  And,
again, all these employees were at-will and could be terminated at any
time—surely a potent deterrent to abuse of the power wielded by all
employees to fail in job duties.  Walking off the job and finding a com-
parable job would have been a difficult enterprise, given Amtrak’s
Congressionally-granted monopoly in the intercity passenger railway
system in the United States.  Further, because Amtrak was the “three
hundred pound gorilla” in the passenger rail system, with no competi-
tion in the intercity market, it faced no real difficulty hiring alterna-
tives.  To label these Amtrak employees “fiduciaries” elevates form
over substance—labels over reality.
Mr. Ward did have an option should he be fired for “disloyal” con-
duct or otherwise: he was designing his own product and planning to
launch his own company.  He perhaps took a risk—the risk that he
would be discovered and fired—in taking those steps while he was em-
ployed by Taser.  But the fact that it was a risk scarcely turned his
relationship with the company into one in which he had the power and
control over his employer’s business and assets, as a true fiduciary
does over the entrustor’s affairs.
In any event, why Mr. Chang, Mr. Ward, and the Amtrak employ-
ees should have owed a “fiduciary duty” to their employers—given the
nature and function of a “fiduciary”—is a riddle.
B. The Mystery—Who Owes a Duty?
As discussed in section II.A, most courts, by reference to the law of
agency, conclude that employees owe a “fiduciary duty” to their em-
ployer, although others simply refer to a “duty of loyalty.”128  Most
frequently, no distinction is drawn by the courts between these two
categories in terms of what the employee can and cannot do.129  Other
courts, however, speak of varying degrees of loyalty owed, depending
on the employee’s particular position with the employer.130  But be-
128. See, e.g., Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Musei, 771 P.2d 486, 492 n.10 (Colo. 1989)
(noting that courts from many jurisdictions refer to a “fiduciary duty,” others to a
“duty of loyalty,” and adopting the more general term “duty of loyalty”).
129. See supra discussion accompanying notes 41–48.
130. Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201, 1211 (10th Cir. 2007) (applying
Texas law) (holding that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the
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cause the employee’s duty of loyalty rests squarely on the law of
agency, which imposes a fiduciary duty, the provenance of any other
“duty of loyalty” for a non-fiduciary employee is a mystery, indeed.  It
would seem to come only from “the deeply rooted conception of the
employment relation as a dominant-servient relation rather than one
of mutual rights and obligations.”131  Arguably, that “conception” is
just an insufficient rationale for the imposition of a legal duty, so only
if the employee qualifies as a “fiduciary” should there be any duty of
loyalty at all.132
Whether a particular employee is a fiduciary is usually answered
by the courts using a broader brush than is employed in the discussion
above.  That is, little if any explicit attention is paid to the balance of
power between employer and employee,133 the extent to which the em-
ployer has ceded control to the employee, or the real possibility of
abuse by the employee because of a position of power and control.134
employer’s breach of fiduciary claim, and the error was not harmless though the
jury had considered the breach of “duty of loyalty” claim).  The court stated that
although the two were “analytically similar,” a fiduciary owes a “distinct and sep-
arate obligation than the duty of loyalty to an employer.” Id.  In Jet Courier, the
court suggested that different degrees of loyalty might be owed depending on the
particular employment relationship: “we need not determine whether the duty of
loyalty discussed in this opinion applies in all its rigor to every employment rela-
tionship regardless of the nature of the work performed by the employee.” Jet
Courier, 771 P.2d at 492 n.10.  Relatedly, some courts note that the employee’s
status may be considered in determining whether there was a breach of the duty.
See, e.g., Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 789 (N.J. 1999).
131. Summers, supra note 21, at 78.
132. Sullivan, supra note 34, argues that “ordinary” employees and fiduciaries should
owe different duties, and only the latter would be subject to forfeiture and other
“extreme” penalties for breach of that duty; non-fiduciaries would only be subject
to breach of contract remedies for breach of the more general “duty of loyalty.”  It
is not clear, however, what would be the justification for imposing any duty of
loyalty at all on “ordinary” employees.
133. But see Diamond Phoenix Corp. v. Small, No. 05-79-P-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12798, at *15–16 (D. Me. June 28, 2005) (applying Maine law) (breach of fiduci-
ary duty claim should be dismissed because complaint alleged no facts indicating
that the employee was ever the “superior party” in the employment relationship);
Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839, 846 (Me. 1999) (“A
fiduciary duty will be found to exist, as a matter of law, only in circumstances
where the law will recognize both the disparate positions of the parties and a
reasonable basis for the placement of trust and confidence in the superior party
in the context of specific events at issue.”).
134. On occasion, usually in the older cases, the specific language of fiduciary law is at
least mentioned.  Thus, a fiduciary relationship has been defined as that which
exists when
there has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and
good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the
interests of the one reposing confidence . . . , [and] ‘it extends to any
possible case in which a fiduciary relationship exists in fact, and in
which there is confidence reposed on one side, and resulting domination
and influence on the other.’
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Instead, these elements are glossed over—or perhaps assumed to be
present—if the employee is a “key employee,” a “manager,”135 or,
more generally, has “policy-making authority or has the ability to
make decisions which bind the company.”136  Even a “low level” em-
ployee may owe the duty if he is in a position of “trust and
confidence.”137
This “limitation” on the imposition of a fiduciary duty is impre-
cise,138 but certainly it is quite narrow.  For one thing, employers put
some degree of “trust and confidence” in all employees, simply by vir-
tue of tasking them with completing certain duties.139  Thus, in order
to cabin this concept slightly, courts may look for some “special” trust,
including, for example, that the employee had access to trade secrets
or confidential information,140 has the authority to negotiate—if not
necessarily execute—contracts binding on the employer,141 or has
some other “meaningful authority.”142  Theoretically, these indicia of
a “fiduciary relationship” would leave at least some non-managerial
Abbitt v. Gregory, 160 S.E. 896, 906 (N.C. 1931) (quoting 25 C.J. Fiduciary § 9, at
1119 (1921)).
135. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 33, 47
(D.D.C.  2011); Talentburst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (D.
Mass. 2008).
136. Modern Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Tooling Specialists, Inc., 557 N.W.2d 835,
838 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). See also Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 568
(Md. App. 1978) (duty of loyalty applies to “corporate officer or other high-echelon
employee”).
137. Chelsea Indus., Inc. v. Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 1983). But cf. Gustafson
v. Full Serv., No. 4:11CV0043AGF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27903, at *6 (E.D. Mo.
March 2, 2012) (stating that the allegation that the employee worked alone and
unsupervised—such that she had been put in a position of trust—was not suffi-
cient to invoke a fiduciary duty).
138. E.g., Talentburst, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (“The definition of ‘position of trust and
confidence’ has not been clearly defined.”).
139. See Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278, 281 (Ga. 1998) (“The
employee-employer relationship is not one from which the law will necessarily
imply fiduciary obligations; however, the facts of a particular case may establish
the existence of a confidential relationship between an employer and an
employee . . . .”).
140. E.g., Talentburst, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 266, n.4; See Fowler v. Varian Assocs., Inc.,
196 Cal. App. 3d 34, 42 (1987).
141. E.g., Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201, 1208 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007)
(applying Texas law).
142. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d
665, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Reeves v. Hanlon, 95
P.3d 513 (Cal. App. 2004); Kinesis Adver., Inc., v. Hill 652 S.E.2d 284, 295 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2007) (“[A]n individual may owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation if he
is considered to be a de facto officer or director, with authority for tasks such as
signing tax returns, offering major input as to the company’s formation and oper-
ation, or managing the company.”).  In contrast, for example, the court in Gustaf-
son stated that the allegation that the employee worked alone and unsupervised
such that she had been put in a position of trust was not sufficient to invoke a
fiduciary duty. Gustafson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27903, at *6.
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employees free from owing a fiduciary duty.  But in reality, if an em-
ployee does something significant and successful enough to warrant
his employer’s filing a lawsuit against him—usually something like
leaving to start a new business or by improving the business of an ex-
employer’s competitor—that “something” in and of itself can be used,
explicitly or implicitly, to demonstrate that the employee had the req-
uisite “trust and confidence.”  According to this patrician approach, a
mere “low level” employee devoid of such “trust and confidence” could
not have succeeded on his own.
In any event, this seems to be the underlying ethos, given the rela-
tive ease with which the courts seem to detect sufficient “authority” in
the employee or “trust” imposed by the employer for the breach of fidu-
ciary claim to go to the jury.143  Most of the employees alleged to have
breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty had at least some form of manage-
rial duties, access to confidential information, or some measure of au-
thority to make decisions on the job.  Many courts simply impose a
“duty of loyalty” on an employee, without analyzing whether the em-
ployee is a fiduciary or not, on the grounds that employees are catego-
rized as agents.  As discussed in section II.A, it is the rare employee,
indeed, who escapes the duty noose.144
Mr. Chang was not a key employee or a manager of his law firm.
The court imposed a fiduciary duty on this at-will associate on the
grounds that his partners and his firm necessarily reposed a “special
trust” in him simply because he was an attorney with the firm.145  The
court pointed to nothing in the record, however, to indicate that Mr.
Chang had access to any confidential information about the firm’s bus-
iness—as opposed to confidential client information which he would
be obligated to protect by his own ethical obligations—or had any au-
143. E.g., Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Riley, 338 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Nothing
in the Restatement [of Agency] indicates, however, that ordinary employees have
no duty of loyalty.”); Lucas v. United Fabricating, Inc., No. 5:06CV54, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 64269, at *14 (N.D.W. Va. Aug 29, 2007) (applying West Virginia
law) (holding an employee who had the authority to “turn away customers” owes
a fiduciary duty).
144. Among these rare exceptions are the seamstresses and one intern, who Mattel
alleged had breached their duty of loyalty by working for MGA Entertainment
while employed by Mattel, giving rise to a claim of aiding and abetting the breach
against MGM in Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., No. CV 04-90492011,
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55756, at *15 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  The court held that no claim lies
in California for breach of a common law duty of loyalty; these employees were
not fiduciaries and, therefore, summary judgment was entered on Mattel’s claim.
See also Cheney v. IPD Analytics, LLP, No. 08-23188-CIV-MORENO/TORRES,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85702, at *14 (dismissing employer’s counterclaim against
employee patent attorney where counterclaim failed to allege either an express or
implied fiduciary relationship).  But, again, these courts held that these “mere”
employees were not subject to a claim for breach, but did not hold that “mere”
employees owe no duty of loyalty at all.
145. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., v. Johnson, 7 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. App. 1999).
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thority to negotiate fees or settlements or make significant decisions
for the firm or its clients.  Mr. Ward, as vice president of marketing, fit
into the “manager,” or perhaps the “key employee,” category of em-
ployees who are traditionally assigned a fiduciary duty.  But this was
not an issue in the decision: the court simply stated that in Arizona,
“an employee/agent owes his or her employer/principal a fiduciary
duty.”146  According to the court, the Amtrak employees were “man-
agement level” and, therefore, owed a fiduciary duty to their em-
ployer.147  The three employees’ titles were, indeed, “managerial,” as
they were Assistant Superintendent for Maine Passenger Service, Se-
nior Analyst in Amtrak’s Operating Practices Section, and District
Manager of Stations, respectively.  But in a company with 17,000 em-
ployees and hundreds, if not thousands, of “managers,” the titles alone
do not indicate that Amtrak reposed any special trust or confidence in
these particular employees.148  In Amtrak, labels eclipsed logic.
When the smoke is cleared from the rhetoric, it becomes clear that
employees are deemed fiduciaries solely because of their role, whether
that role is “associate,” “manager,” or “key employee” of some sort.  As-
signing fiduciary duties to anyone in the role of “trustee” or “director”
may make imminent sense, given that any trustee and any director is
truly acting as a fiduciary for the beneficiary or shareholder.  But
deeming any “manager” a fiduciary when that “manager” may or may
not have any really special role to play in the company’s business
seems a more dubious proposition.  Even more dubious is the proposi-
tion that anyone would know ex ante whether they qualified as a
“manager,” “key employee,” or had some special trust or confidence
imposed in them by the employer—when all they probably know is
that they are supposed to do their job.  It would be a mystery.
C. An Enigma—What is a Breach?
The courts typically employ sweeping language to describe the
duty of loyalty owed by employees.  Thus, for example, the employee is
bound to “exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty,”149 and act
146. Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Ward, 231 P.3d 921, 926 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting McCal-
lister Co. v. Kastella, 825 P.2d 980, 982 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
147. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 33,
47–48 (D.D.C.  2011).
148. But see FBK Partners, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 09-292, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126265,
at *12–14 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment
because the defendant’s “title of ‘manager’ alone supports a contention of fiduci-
ary duties where there were no further facts” regarding the defendant’s scope of
employment were offered).
149. AGA Aktiebolag v. ABA Optical Corp., 441 F. Supp. 747, 754 (E.D.N.Y 1977).
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“solely for the benefit of the principal.”150  However, just as an agent
owes a fiduciary duty “in all matters concerned with his agency,”151 an
employee owes a duty of loyalty only within the scope of employ-
ment.152  Another specific exception to the duty of loyalty applicable in
almost all jurisdictions is the employee’s right to prepare to compete:
the employee does not breach the duty by making preparations to com-
pete with the employer after the employment relationship has en-
ded,153 though he cannot actually compete while still employed.154
These two limitations on the duty of loyalty theoretically give employ-
ees significant tools to enhance their financial security.  That is, given
a labor market in which “employers no longer implicitly offer workers
long-term job security and employees no longer expect to remain in
the same job for their lifetime,”155 the employee’s right to explore al-
ternative employers and alternative careers156 should facilitate labor
mobility and reduce the threat of sudden job loss.  The problem with
the first exception (scope of employment), however, is that it is rarely
analyzed and frequently ignored by the courts.  And the second—pre-
pare to compete versus compete—is so vague as to be virtually incom-
prehensible, or at least difficult to apply in practice.
These problems are evident in the representative cases.157  In
Taser, for example, the court duly noted that Mr. Ward had a “duty to
act with entire good faith and loyalty for the furtherance of the inter-
ests of his principal in all matters concerning or affecting the subject
150. E.g., Gross v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, 599 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D.C.C.
2009).
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
152. E.g., Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (Md. Ct. App. 1978) (duty of
employee to act solely for the benefit of employer in all matters within the scope
of employment); Chelsea Indus., Inc. v. Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Mass.
1983).
153. E.g., Radio TV Reports v. Ingersoll, No. 86-2852, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11942, at
*8 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 1989).  This distinction is drawn “to accommodate the compet-
ing policy considerations of honesty and fair dealing on the one hand and free and
vigorous economic competition on the other.”  Jet Courier Service, Inc. v. Musei,
771 P.2d 486, 493 (Colo. 1989).  Thus, the courts grant “a privilege in favor of
employees which enables them to prepare or make arrangements to compete with
their employers prior to leaving the employ of their prospective rivals without
fear of incurring liability for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty.” Md. Met-
als, 382 A.2d at 569.
154. E.g., Las Luminarias v. Isengard, 587 P.2d 444, 452 (N.M. 1978).  See cases from
various jurisdictions cited in Fielding, supra note 25, at 206.  Kentucky appears
to be the only jurisdiction in which even preparatory steps to compete are prohib-
ited, at least if the employee is a director or officer. See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scan-
steel Serv. Ctr., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1991).
155. Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 36.
156. See, e.g., Las Luminaras, 587 P.2d at 452.
157. In Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, the court did not reach the issue of
whether there was sufficient evidence of breach to survive summary Judgment.
Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 7 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. App. 1999).
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of his agency.”158  The alleged breach was that Mr. Ward developed a
design for a clip-on camera that could compete with Taser products,
even if Taser did not have such a camera on the market.  Because Mr.
Ward “was not responsible for product conception, design, or develop-
ment at the company,”159 whatever he did—compete, prepare to com-
pete, or something in between—was arguably outside the scope of his
employment and, therefore, no breach.  But without even mentioning
“scope of employment,” the court denied Mr. Ward’s motion for sum-
mary judgment.  Similarly, in Amtrak, the court recited the rule that
an employee owes a duty “to act solely for the benefit of the principal
in all matters concerned with his agency” without analyzing what
“matters” were “concerned with” “their agency.”160  The alleged breach
was that three Amtrak employees allowed their names to be used in a
potential rival’s bid for a contract.  Because, as Veolia argued repeat-
edly, these employees had no job responsibility remotely related to
business development, procurement, solicitations, or even contracting,
whatever they did was outside the scope of their employment and per
se no breach.  The court effectively ignored this argument.
In Taser, Amtrak, and the vast majority of cases dealing with the
duty of loyalty issue, the scope of employment limitation on the duty of
loyalty telescopes into the “compete/prepare to compete” paradigm.
That is, if the alleged breach is that the employee disloyally “com-
peted” with the employer, the courts fail to ascertain whether or not
that conduct is outside the scope of employment.  Two limits on the
duty of loyalty become one.
And that one is vague, indeed.161  The line between preparation to
compete—or “preliminary steps” to compete in the words of some
courts—and competition has some definite mileposts.  Generally, if an
employee actively solicits the employer’s customers or clients,162 or
158. Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Ward, 231 P.3d 921, 926 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
159. Id. at 927 n.11.
160. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 33, at
46 (D.D.C.  2011) (quoting Gross v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP, 599
F. Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D.D.C. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 cmt. c (“In retrospect it may prove
difficult to assess the propriety of a former agent’s conduct because many actions
may be proper or improper, depending on . . . the surrounding circumstances.  For
that reason it may be difficult to draw a clean distinction between actions prior to
termination of an agency relationship that constitute mere preparation for com-
petition, which do not contravene an employee’s or other agent’s duty to the prin-
cipal, and actions that constitute competition.”).
162. E.g., Guidant Sales Corp. v. George, No. 05-2890 (PAM/JSM), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83008, at *11–13 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2006); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
791 F. Supp. 2d at 49; Radio TV Reports v. Ingersoll, No. 86-2852, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11942, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 1989); Inner-Tite Corp. v. Brozowski, No.
2010-0156, 2010 Mass. Super. LEXIS 159, at *63–65 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2010); but
see Of Skincare, LLC v. Phytoceuticals, No. CV 08-4470 ODW, 2009 U.S. Dist.
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leads a “mass resignation” of employees,163 disloyal competition has
occurred.  Drafting a business plan, renting office space, or having
preliminary conversations with potential partners or employees is
probably preparing to compete.  But what real people do when they
are planning to change jobs or open a new business rarely fits neatly
into one of these categories, and everyone does these things in a differ-
ent way.164  For example, what language in a conversation with a pro-
spective client turns it from a “preliminary” contact to a
“solicitation?”165  As one scholar concludes, “The preliminary steps
doctrine . . . has failed to be a workable standard. Courts struggle to
explain which preliminary activities are competitive. The lines drawn
between what constitutes mere preparation and actual competition
have been arbitrary . . . .”166
If it is well-recognized by courts and commentators alike that the
line between preparing to compete and competing is “arbitrary,” it is
not so commonly observed that what is firmly placed on the “compete”
side of the line actually has nothing to do with true competition.
Thus, if an employee is “competing” with the employer during the em-
ployment relationship, he has breached the duty of loyalty even if the
LEXIS 58241 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2009) (denying defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on breach of duty claim arising out of mass resignation).
163. See United Aircraft Corp. v. Boreen, 413 F.2d 694, 699 (3d Cir. 1969) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Jet Courier Service, Inc. v. Musei, 771 P.2d 486, 497 (Colo.
1989); ABC Trans Nat’l Transp., Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc., 413 N.E.2d
1299 (Ill. App. 1980).
164. Cf. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Hoskins, No. 5:10cv087, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30770, at *15 (W.D. Va. March 7, 2012) (“Whether [an employee’s] specific
conduct taken prior to resignation [or termination] breaches a fiduciary duty re-
quires a case by case analysis.”) (quoting Feddeman & Co., C.P.A., P.C. v. Langan
Assocs., P.C., 530 S.E. 2d 668, 672 (Va. 2000)); Guidant, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83008,
at *13 (“Whether an employee breached a duty of loyalty must be determined by
considering all relevant circumstances.”); Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d
921, 935 (Cal. 1966) (“No ironclad rules as to the type of conduct which is permis-
sible can be stated, since the spectrum of activities in this regard is as broad as
the ingenuity of man itself.”); Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 570 (Md.
Ct. App. 1978) (“[T]he ultimate determination of whether an employee has
breached his fiduciary duties to his employer by preparing to engage in a compet-
ing enterprise must be grounded upon a thoroughgoing examination of the facts
and circumstances of the particular case.”).  On occasion, however, as discussed
below in regard to Amtrak, certain employee conduct may be common industry-
wide, and a successful claim of breach of fiduciary duty based on that conduct
may affect the future conduct of thousands of employees.
165. See Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v. Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn. App.
1987) (reversing summary judgment for employee and remanding for determina-
tion of whether employee’s pretermination contacts with employer’s customers
amounted to impermissible solicitation); Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266, 272
(Tex. App. 1985) (holding the issue of whether breach occurred when employer’s
client discussed “possibility” of giving business to employees if they left the em-
ployer but gave no “assurance”).
166. Fielding, supra note 25, at 206.
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employer has suffered no competitive harm.  That is, as discussed in
section II.A, the disloyal employee is subject to forfeiture of monies
owed and disgorgement of profits made even if the employer can prove
no loss of profits or customers or any other compensatory damages.
Under these circumstances, where the employee has presumably
found its own customers or new market segment and has not taken a
share of the employer’s business, it is a stretch to deem the employee’s
business as “competing” with the employer.  In other words, the line
between “competing” and simply succeeding at a business or changing
employment is just arbitrary, at least insofar as it is divorced from the
concept of “competition” with the employer.
Another example of the disconnection between true competition
and what is deemed disloyal “competition” occurs when the employee
simply changes jobs, moving from one large corporation to another.  If
the employee took steps before changing jobs that are deemed to have
aided the new employer, the employee has breached the duty of loy-
alty, and the new employer becomes the “aider and abettor” of the
breach.167  But this is backward.  Though “competition” is the breach,
it is the new employer doing the competing, not the employee.  None of
the three Amtrak employees submitted a competing bid to SFRTA, nor
could they have.  The employee in this situation, in effect, aids and
abets the new employer in competing with the old employee.  But
then, where is the breach?  It is an enigma.
IV. WHY “LOYAL?”
It is argued above that the confusion and uncertainty in the justifi-
cation for the duty of loyalty—that employees are fiduciaries of their
employers—and in key aspects of applying the law in its current state
undermine its validity and predictability.  The argument now turns to
the older jurisprudential foundation for the duty of loyalty—the
master–servant relationship—and demonstrates the invalidity of that
relationship to the modern-day employment relationship, as well as
the lack of any sound policy or practical rationale for requiring at-will
employees to be “loyal.”
A. The Loyal Servant
As illustrated above, deriving an at-will employee’s duty of loyalty
from fiduciary principles is a significant stretch.  But the modern view
that the legal duty of an employee rests on fiduciary principles evolved
from a very different type of relationship in the not-so-distant back-
ground—the master–servant relationship.168  Before jettisoning the
167. E.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Veolia, 592 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2009).
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 cmt. a (1957). (“A master is a species
of principal, and a servant is a species of agent.”); James J. Brudney, Reluctance
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duty of loyalty completely, the solidity of that older foundation must
be examined.
One might question why the modern employee should be equated
to a “servant” in this regard, thus perpetuating the “conception of the
employment relation as one of employer dominance and employee sub-
servience.”169  But another, less politically-charged question is how
the ancient role of the servant can possibly be mapped onto that of the
modern employee?  Thus, if loyalty should be owed by an employee/
servant, to whom and how should it be demonstrated?
The paradigm of the loyal servant, perhaps, is the valet who
dresses and otherwise attends to the needs of the master.  Loyalty is
owed to the master, of course.  The needs and desires of the mistress
should be considered, and perhaps even the children of the manor
taken into account, but in the event of any conflict, there is no ques-
tion about divided loyalty: to the master and the master alone it is
owed.  The valet demonstrates the required loyalty by performing his
duties in exemplary fashion, keeping the confidences of the master
and his family, and doing nothing to dishonor the master, his family,
or the manor.170
Fast forward to today.  In similar fashion, supposedly, Amtrak’s
employees are to be loyal to the corporation.  Certainly, employees
may well feel some sense of loyalty to the business for which they
work.  But surely this feeling is directed to one’s coworkers, supervi-
sor, or even the corporate officers, and not truly to the legal construct
called a “corporation.”  In any event, the relationship between an em-
ployee at will and a corporate employer bears little, if any, resem-
blance to the personal bonds between a lord and his valet.
A partnership or sole proprietorship is, perhaps, different: an em-
ployee could truly be loyal to the one person or three partners for
whom he worked.  But even here, another distinction between the
master–servant paradigm and the employee at will arises.  Though a
master had complete authority over a servant, he also had some re-
sponsibility for caring for the servant—feeding and clothing him, at
and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in American Em-
ployment Law, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 773, 794 (2011) (“By contrast [with
the law in other countries], the primary employee duties of loyalty under U.S.
law—nondiversion of employer business to a competitor while still employed,
nondisclosure of confidential information, nondisparagement of the employer’s
products and services—seem to be grounded in the earlier, hierarchical master-
servant relationship rather than in more contemporary, egalitarian contractual
norms.”); Cooney, supra note 49, at 855 n.9 (“The duty of loyalty derives from the
basic obligation of faithful service found in English master and servant law and
has been a part of our earliest common law.”).
169. Summers, supra note 21, at 84.
170. See generally Downton Abbey (PBS television broadcast).
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least—during the relationship.171  The food may have been poor and
the clothing shoddy, but there was some mutuality of obligation be-
tween the master and the servant.  That mutuality of obligation is
missing in the modern duty of loyalty doctrine.  The at-will employee
must be loyal to the employer, but the employer owes no such duty to
the employee.172  Given its history, one might be forgiven for wonder-
ing why the duty of loyalty the courts impose today is not, at the very
least, reciprocal.
At least two additional differences between the role of servant and
employee can be identified.  First, the master–servant relationship
was based on status,173 and the servant was bound to the master until
the master chose to discharge or emancipate the servant.174  Imposing
a duty of loyalty on the servant did not, therefore, serve as any addi-
tional limitation on the servant’s economic mobility.  The duty of loy-
alty of an at-will employee works far differently.  Though empirical
evidence of the economic impact of the duty of loyalty is lacking,
surely it is true that “employers can avail themselves of the em-
ployee’s duty of loyalty defensively, to prevent an employee from raid-
ing its customers and other workers, or offensively, to punish the
employee for taking another job or to deter others from joining
him.”175  Thus, “this mandatory rule of law gives employers a power-
ful tool to counteract labor market forces that pose a threat to
them.”176
Second, because the role of the servant was a specific legal status,
it seems unlikely the servant was unaware of his role.  The specific
demands of the role may have been unknown until taught, but it
would not come as a surprise to the servant to learn that he was a
servant.  Perhaps this is not so true of the employee.  An empirical
study indicates that at-will employees have a poor understanding of
171. See Frankel, supra note 112, at 799 (“Although the Power Bearer may attempt to
minimize the care he gives and maximize the service he extracts, the Power
Bearer takes care of the Dependent in order to ensure the Dependent’s services or
other benefits from the relation for himself.”) (discussing master–servant and
other status relationships).
172. As discussed below, in some jurisdictions the employer owes a duty of “good faith
and fair dealing” even if the employment relationship is at-will.  The Restatement
(Third) of Agency § 8.15 (2006) provides that a principal owes the agent a duty to
deal with the agent “fairly and in good faith,” but loyalty is not in the picture at
all.
173. See  Frankel, supra note 112, at 805.
174. Id.
175. O’Neill, supra note 120, at 697–98.
176. Id. at 698.  See also Stone, supra note 4 (“Courts have become increasingly recep-
tive to employer efforts to limit employee use of human capital by adopting ex-
pansive theories of trade secrets and employees’ duty of loyalty, and by
expanding the circumstances under which they will enforce covenants not to
compete.”).
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their role insofar as the law grants the employer the right to termi-
nate the relationship “at will.”177  It seems quite likely that it would
similarly be surprising for at will employees to learn that their duty to
be loyal to the employer rests, at least in part, on their categorization
as “servants” of the employer.
It would seem, then, that the loyal servant relationship should be
relegated to history’s dustbin, and not be used as a template of what is
expected of a modern-day employee.
B. The Vulnerable Master
Though the duty of loyalty is a broad concept, in practice it often
arises when the employee has done something that allegedly damages
the employer’s business.  From the policy perspective, a primary rea-
son for imposing this duty is that the employer is particularly vulnera-
ble to “exploitative” behavior by employees resulting in loss of
business or profits.  An employee can easily lure a client he serves to
himself or another business, or induce fellow employees, with whom
he has a close relationship, to leave.178  And certainly, there are
breach of duty cases in which the facts indicate that a high-level em-
ployee apparently secured a significant amount of the employer’s busi-
ness while he was employed, which may strike one as “exploitative,”
indeed.
“Exploit” means to “use . . . for one’s own ends.”179  What the em-
ployee is “using” in setting up his own business, presumably, is some-
thing that was “taken” from the employer, else why would that
conduct be wrongful?  That is, it is apparently just assumed that an
employee cannot compete with the employer except for the existence of
some benefit the employer has bestowed on the employee, of which it
would be “disloyal” or unfair for the employee to use against the
employer.
But this assumption—and the whole notion that an employee must
have taken something from the employer when she successfully com-
petes with it—is rarely if ever based on any evidence in the case.180
177. See generally Kim, supra note 6.
178. Fielding, supra note 25, at 219–20. See Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d
564, 569–70 (Md. App. 1978) (“Examples of misconduct which will defeat the
right to make arrangements to compete include: misappropriation of trade
secrets; misuse of confidential information; solicitation of employer’s customers
prior to cessation of employment; conspiracy to bring about mass resignation of
employer’s key employees; usurpation of employer’s business opportunity.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
179. Exploit, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/exploit?s=t (last
visited July 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/DAX4-C5H9.
180. This assumption may also be quite contrary to what employees expect.  One
scholar argues that at-will employees expect employers to provide training that
can be used to increase employment potential pursuant to a “new psychological
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The employer need not prove that the employee, in fact, exploited the
employment relationship to “compete” with the employer; this is never
recited as an element of the breach of duty claim.  To be sure, if the
employer is seeking compensatory damages, it must prove that the
employee’s behavior caused its economic loss.  But this is a different
issue—the employee may have successfully taken some of the em-
ployer’s business, causing damage, but only because he was inherently
a good salesman and not because of anything he learned on the job.
For example, Mr. Ward, a marketing professional, worked for
Taser for less than three years when he conceived of his clip-on cam-
era device.  He may have been made aware of Taser’s plans for devel-
oping devices comparable to his clip-on camera—an issue which was
in dispute181—but there was no evidence that he used anything he
learned from or did for Taser as an employee that contributed to his
inspiration.  Certainly the court gave no indication that Taser would
have to introduce any such evidence.182  In Amtrak, the court found
that there was sufficient evidence that its employees put themselves
in “direct competition” with Amtrak by participating in a competitor’s
bid to withstand a motion for summary judgment.  But the court made
no mention of any facts that might indicate that such participation
was enabled by anything those employees had gained or received from
Amtrak; for example, there was no discussion of any training, years of
service, specific accomplishments or rewards.
Thus, establishing that an employee has breached the duty of loy-
alty by competing with the employer does not require proof of any true
“exploitation” of employer-provided skills or resources.  Nor, as dis-
cussed in section III.C, does proving a breach require any showing of
contract.” See generally Stone, supra note 4.  “One of the most important terms of
the new psychological contract is the employers’ promise of general training and
employability security in exchange for employee motivation, commitment, and
organizational citizenship behavior.” Id. at 590–91.  Thus,
[w]hen an employer has promised to give an employee skill development
and general knowledge as part of the employment deal, then it cannot be
said that the employer has paid for its acquisition.  Nor can it be as-
sumed that the employer intended to preclude the employee from using
knowledge for her own advantage.  Rather, the employee’s right to ob-
tain and use the knowledge is often part of the overall employment
package.
Id. at 591. See also Michael J. Garrison and John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of
Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Ap-
proach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 166–67 (2008) (“Rather, if the employer makes any
implied commitment at all, it is that employment will provide employees with the
skills and experiences necessary to make them competitive in the market.  Em-
ployability, not employment, is what the employer implicitly offers in exchange
for the employee’s efforts and productivity.”).
181. The parties also disputed whether Taser had any such plans at all.  Taser Int’l,
Inc. v. Ward, 231 P.3d 921, 928 n.13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
182. Id. at 928.
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competitive harm.  Indeed, as discussed in section II.A, proving a
breach does not require a showing of any harm to the employer at all.
The employee who breaches the duty of loyalty, on the other hand, is
subject to “pretty strong medicine,”183 including disgorgement of prof-
its and, in some states, punitive damages.184  One might question
whether this imbalance is at all fair.
V. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
In the sections above, the duty of loyalty imposed on an at-will em-
ployee has been criticized on many fronts.  Nonetheless, the fact re-
mains that an employer’s business can be damaged by an employee:
Amtrak claimed that it lost some $20 million in profits by losing a
procurement contract as a result of the conduct of its employees.185
This fact does not necessarily justify imposing a duty of loyalty, how-
ever, because of the myriad deterrents and punishments for damaging
employee conduct the employer already has available.  Arguably, if
there are any holes in the employer’s armor, those holes would be bet-
ter filled by imposing a duty of “good faith and fair dealing” on the
employee, which duty should also be mutual and reciprocal.
A. Conduct Prohibited and Remedies Available
Most courts hold that an employee, regardless of his status, is obli-
gated by the duty of loyalty to refrain from the following: competing
with the employer while employed; disclosing or using confidential in-
formation for any purpose other than the employer’s benefit; and ap-
propriating the employer’s property or self-dealing.186  An
“overwhelming number of reported decisions recognizing the em-
ployee’s duty of loyalty fall into one or more of these fact patterns.”187
Assuming these particular types of conduct are most likely to occur
and harm the employer—else why would most lawsuits arise from this
type of conduct—the question is whether imposing a duty of loyalty on
an at-will employee is a necessary and effective deterrent to this type
of conduct or gives rise to a unique claim without which the employer
could not recover compensation for the damage caused.  The answer
appears to be no.
As to whether the duty of loyalty is necessary to deter harmful em-
ployee conduct, it would seem the alternative—the fact that the at-
will employee can be fired at any time—should be powerful enough.
183. Sullivan, supra note 34, at 780.
184. Id. at 780, n.14.
185. At trial, the jury found that Amtrak failed to prove causation.
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01, cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 7,
2010).
187. Id.
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Given any whiff of possible danger—an employee is becoming too
“chummy” with clients and appears to be aiming to take off on his own
with those clients, or failing to follow protocol to protect confidential
information and perhaps scheming to download that information on a
thumb drive to sell it to a competitor—the employer can simply let the
employee go.  Any actual harm can thereby be avoided.  Of course,
given a small business, a tight labor market, or the fact that a highly-
valued or “key” employee is involved, firing the employee may not be a
viable option.  But giving a stern admonition and a warning that the
employee is under suspicion could accomplish the objective of stopping
the threatening conduct before it causes any true damage to the em-
ployer.  The warning would also give the employee fair warning of
what the employer expects.  Another fact that may diminish the em-
ployer’s option to terminate as a deterrent to harmful conduct is the
difficulty of detecting it, particularly given that employees are increas-
ingly mobile and more likely to be working on a tablet or smartphone
in an airport rather than a PC in the office.188  But a private employer
is generally free to monitor employee behavior—screening electronic
communications on company-provided tablets and phones, for exam-
ple—and, increasingly, employers are taking advantage of this
opportunity.189
In any event, imposing a duty of loyalty arguably adds little deter-
rent force to the power to terminate.  The employer can terminate at a
mere suspicion.  The duty of loyalty can be invoked only if the em-
ployer can prove an actual breach—and it can be very difficult to as-
certain whether the facts demonstrate a probable breach, given the
uncertainties and ambiguities in the rules in this regard.190  The duty
of loyalty does little, if anything, to aid in early detection of potentially
harmful behaviors—with the exception of a few jurisdictions, the duty
does not require the employee to disclose that he is preparing to com-
pete with the employer.191  An employee may refrain from competing
with the employer or preparing to compete, knowing he could be im-
mediately fired for doing so.  But it is doubtful that many employees
consider the abstract and abstruse principle of “fiduciary duty” as im-
pinging on their very real, day-to-day decisions on employment oppor-
tunities or career enhancements.
As for other potentially harmful conduct, it seems highly unlikely
that an employee would disclose that he is planning or preparing to do
188. Marian K. Riedy, Suman Beros, & H. Joseph Wen, Managing Business
Smartphone Data, 14 J. INTERNET L. 3 (2011).
189. See generally Marian K. Riedy & H. Joseph Wen, Electronic Monitoring of In-
ternet Access in the American Workplace: Implications for Management, 19 INFO.
& COMM. TECH. L. 87 (March 2010).
190. See supra  section III.B.
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 cmt. c (2006).
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something that might harm the business because he feels bound by
the duty of loyalty—misappropriate property, for example.  He may,
however, refrain because—as is quite well known in the vernacular—
this would just be theft.  Thus, to the extent that the duty of loyalty
prohibits conduct that is otherwise prohibited by the law, it would
serve no additional purpose as a deterrent to that conduct unless the
prohibitions of the duty were more widely and clearly known than
those of other laws, which seems unlikely.192
Much of the conduct prohibited by the duty of loyalty, however, is
not specifically prohibited by other laws.  Competing with the em-
ployer and “self-dealing” are not, per se, otherwise prohibited by
law.193  Nor is it illegal to use confidential information—which is not a
trade secret—unless such information is obtained through illegal
means, such as “hacking” into a computer or smartphone.  Thus, these
additional prohibitions imposed by the duty may have some deterrent
value—particularly if an employer successfully sues for breach, the
case becomes generally known in the business or industry, and the
“condemned” conduct has been widespread.  However, given that the
fact pattern in breach of duty cases varies widely,194 the efficacy of the
duty of loyalty in deterring harm remains questionable at best.
The duty of loyalty may be largely meaningless in terms of deter-
ring harmful behavior, but it does provide an avenue for the employer
to seek compensatory relief for any harm actually caused by breach of
the duty—at least in those jurisdictions in which the breach stands as
a separate claim.195  But in this role, the duty is partly duplicative
because of the existence of other claims that the conduct of the “dis-
loyal” employee often implicates, or there are other remedies the em-
ployer can employ to prevent harm.  Thus, regarding the prohibition
against competing with the employer, a typical case is Taser, in which
the employee is sued for having set up a competing business or left to
work for a competitor.  The fact that he has been sued must mean that
the employer lost something because of that move—something other
than just the services of the employee who, as an at-will employee, can
leave at any time without consequence.  What might that “something”
be?  What is typically alleged to have been taken includes customers
or prospective customers, proprietary information, or the opportunity
192. See supra  sections III.A–B, and text accompanying note 160.
193. The exceptions, of course, are statutory and common law prohibitions against
“self-dealing” by corporate directors and officers and other true fiduciaries, such
as trustees.
194. See, e.g., Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 935 (Cal. 1966) (“No iron-
clad rules as to the type of conduct which is permissible can be stated, since the
spectrum of activities in this regard is as broad as the ingenuity of man itself.”).
195. The other role of the breach of duty claim or defense—to justify termination or
non-payment or punish the ex-employee by seeking disgorgement or punitive
damages—is discussed below.
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to use work time and employer equipment or resources to develop in-
tellectual property (which is owned by the employer pursuant to the
“work for hire” doctrine).  These “takings” give rise to independent
claims—other than duty of loyalty—for compensatory relief: tortious
interference with contract and with prospective business advan-
tage,196 misappropriation,197 conversion,198 and infringement of intel-
lectual property.199
Cases involving “pure” competition with the employer and no con-
comitant wrong do, however, exist.  In Taser, the employee used only
his own time, without using any resources or information obtained
from the employer, to design a new product, which Taser alleged con-
stituted disloyal competition because it was working on a design for a
similar product.200  The only valid claim under these circumstances is
breach of the duty of loyalty by competing with the employer.201  Simi-
larly, against an employee who solicits co-employees to “defect” and
start or join another firm—if those employees are at-will—the only
valid claim may be breach of the duty.202  One might question
whether a claim for compensation under these circumstances is justi-
fied at all: Why punish the resourceful employee who, it should be re-
called, is performing his job duties just fine?  One might also wonder
whether more harm would be prevented by allowing an employee to
openly compete without running afoul of the duty of loyalty, rather
than punishing him and thereby encouraging the employee to surrep-
titiously prepare to compete.  At least in the former situation, the em-
ployer would have an opportunity to prepare for what might come.  In
any event, the employer has a ready means of preventing harm from
196. See, e.g., Keystone Fruit Mtkg., Inc. v. Brownfield, 352 F. App’x 169, 172 (9th Cir.
2009); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Hoskins, No. 5:10cv087, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30770, at *15 (W.D. Va., March 7, 2012); Guidant Sales Corp. v.
George, No. 05-2890 (PAM/JSM), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83008, at *13 (D. Minn.
Nov. 14, 2006); Cent. Lewmar, L.P. v. Gentilin, No. 03-4671(JWB), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 45902, at *10 (D.N.J. June 1, 2005) (New Jersey law); Benchmark
Med. Holdings, Inc. v. Rehab Solutions, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1267 (M.D.
Ala. 2004); Bray v. Squires, 702 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. App. 1985).
197. E.g., Diamond Phoenix Corp. v. Small, No. 05-79-P-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12798 (D. Me. June 28, 2005) (applying Maine law); News Am. Mktg. In-Store,
Inc. v. Marquis, 862 A.2d 837 (Conn. 2004).
198. E.g, Diamond Phoenix, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12798; News Am. Mktg., 862 A.2d
837.
199. See, e.g., Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Ward, 231 P.3d 921, 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
200. These are essentially the facts, as found by the court, in Taser, though the em-
ployer had alleged misappropriation and other claims.
201. See generally Taser, 231 P.3d 921 (granting employee summary judgment on all
claims but breach of fiduciary duty).
202. See generally Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Musei, 771 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1989) (alleging
breach for competing while employed by soliciting co-employees as well as meet-
ing with customers).
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competing employees without the need for a claim of breach of duty: a
non-compete agreement.203
A similar analysis and conclusion holds regarding a claim for
breach based on the disclosure or use of confidential information.  To
the extent that the information at issue constitutes trade secrets, an
employee would be subject to a claim of misappropriation or conver-
sion, and no separate duty-based claim would be necessary for the em-
ployer to seek compensatory damages.  To protect confidential
information not otherwise protected by law, the employer could pre-
vent unauthorized disclosure or use by requiring employees to execute
a confidentiality agreement.  An employee who appropriates prop-
erty—the penultimate, specific prohibition ascribed to the duty of loy-
alty—can be sued for conversion or trespass.  The final prohibited act
imposed by the duty of loyalty—“self-dealing”—is less often raised in
cases in which the employer is seeking compensatory damages.204
This is probably because, for the employer to have suffered direct loss
as a consequence of an employee’s self-dealing, it must also have suf-
fered some form of competitive injury.  For that reason, when self-
dealing is raised as a complaint against an employee, the specific in-
jury allegedly caused is similar to that caused by competition: the em-
ployee “self-dealt” by contacting customers or otherwise engaging in
conduct preparatory to leaving and setting up a new business or work-
ing with a new company.205  When these types of facts underlie the
claim of breach based on self-dealing, the analysis and conclusion
stated above—in regard to the prohibition against competing—would
apply, and suggest that no separate claim is necessary.
203. This point was made in a related context by Fielding, supra note 25, at 231.  Gen-
erally an agreement not to compete during and for a reasonable time after termi-
nation of the employment relationship with an at-will employee is enforceable,
though with some exceptions. See generally Kate O’Neill, “Should I Stay or
Should I Go?”—Covenants Not to Compete in a Down Economy: A Proposal for
Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 83 (2010).
During the employment relationship the employee could simply be prohibited
from competing as a term of employment, but a non-compete agreement may pro-
vide the additional remedy of breach of contract to the employer’s right simply to
terminate the employee who competes.
204. An employee may, of course, engage in other types of conduct that harm the em-
ployer: defaming the employer, for example, or hacking into the computer system.
But for these wrongs that are not directly related to the employment relationship,
other remedies lie, such as claims sounding in tort or alleging violations of state
or federal statutes.
205. See, e.g., Charter Oak Lending Group, L.L.C. v. August, 14 A.3d 449 (Conn. 2011)
(defendants, former employees, alleged to have improperly solicited plaintiff’s
customers to move business to their new employer and thereby engaged in pro-
hibited “self-dealing”).  The same is true when the allegation is that the employee
“usurped [a] corporate opportunity,” conduct closely related to “self-dealing.” See,
e.g., Taser, 231 P.3d at 930–31.
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The concept of self-dealing is, however, broader than causing eco-
nomic injury to the employer,206 and it is by invoking those other as-
pects of self-dealing—the employee obtains “secret profits”207 or is
involved in a transaction in which the employee had an interest ad-
verse to his employer208—that the employer can utilize a breach of
duty solely to punish the “disloyal servant.”209  It is argued above that
the notion of “loyalty” has no place in the modern marketplace, and
this argument gains force from the fact that the employer gains little
additional legal protection from enforcing the duty of loyalty, other
than the right to punish for disloyalty.  One might argue that the de-
termination of whether punishment is due should be left to the crimi-
nal justice system,210 and not to the “divine right” of the employer.211
But to the skeptical, a further point should be noted: the employer has
an alternative to using the prohibition against self-dealing imposed by
the duty of loyalty to prevent self-dealing and punish an employee for
its consequences, and that is an employment contract including such a
prohibition.212  To be sure, a contractual arrangement is not the per-
fect solution from the employer’s point of view.213  But on the other
side of the scales of justice stands the at-will employee’s need to set
aside something extra by “self-dealing” in order to be able to survive
the economic consequences of a sudden termination of employment.
B. An Alternative Duty
Though the duty of loyalty imposed on an at-will employee may
largely be unnecessary in terms of protecting the employer from direct
harm caused by the employee, the fact remains that employers must
cede some authority and control to employees, thereby leaving the em-
ployer vulnerable to abuse of that authority and control.  This fact
gives rise to a legitimate need to fill the gaps—small though they may
be—between the legal obligations imposed on everyone—to refrain
from misappropriation of trade secrets and tortious interference with
206. Self-dealing is defined as “[p]articipation in a transaction that benefits oneself
instead of another who is owed a fiduciary duty.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1481
(9th Ed. 2009).
207. E.g., Bessman v. Bessman, 520 P.2d 1210, 1218–19 (Kan. 1974).
208. E.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574 (N.Y. 1989).
209. See generally Sullivan, supra note 34.
210. Sullivan similarly objects to the “draconian” effects of the faithless servant doc-
trine, but proposes a different solution: that only true “fiduciary” employees be
liable for the traditional punitive damages but other employees, owing a lesser
duty of loyalty, should be subject only to traditional breach of contract damages.
Id.
211. Summers, supra note 21.
212. This point was also made by Fielding, supra note 25, at 231 (“The employer,
therefore, could buy additional protection by bargaining for a fixed-term
contract.”).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 13–17.
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contract, for example—and those imposed on employees.  Further,
some employers make significant investment in identifying, hiring,
and training employees—and it may be fair to require, in return,
something from the employee more than mere performance.
From the employee’s point of view—though the duty of loyalty as
currently constituted may be vague, outdated, and unfair—the impo-
sition of some special obligations between employer and employee may
just make sense.  Many employees undoubtedly feel some sense of
“loyalty” to the business or the boss.  And most would surely admit
that the employment relationship is, after all, a unique and a signifi-
cant lifetime investment.  Indeed, for many people the employment re-
lationship is one of the most significant relationships in their lives,
one in which much is invested and from which much is expected.  To
the extent that the imposition of a duty above and beyond the duty to
perform may strengthen the employment relationship and increase
the return on that investment, bearing such a duty may be worth the
price.
What is proposed, then, is to replace the duty of loyalty for at-will
employees with a duty of good faith and fair dealing214 as “gap fillers”
and to promote a trusting and productive working relationship.  It is
also proposed that the duty be mutual.
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is, of course, that which is
universally imposed on both parties to a contract.215  In contracts for
the sale of goods, the duty is defined as follows:  “honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned.”216  The U.C.C. further provides
that, for a merchant, the duty also requires “the observance of reason-
able commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”217  At the
common law, the definition of the duty varies somewhat from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, but a common theme is that both parties must act
with “faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other party.”218  In fashioning a non-
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing to be imposed on the at-
will employment relationship, it would seem reasonable to employ the
key concepts from these various definitions: the duty would funda-
214. In the at-will employment context, the courts typically focus on the duty of loy-
alty of the employee as an agent of the employer.  The “full” complement of duties
of an agent, as a fiduciary, however, are often more broadly defined as including
the duties of “good faith, loyalty, and fair dealing [towards his or her principal].”
E.g., Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 962 (Del.
1980) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1957)).  From this per-
spective, what is proposed is simply to delete the “loyalty” and retain the remain-
der of the agent/employee’s traditional duties.
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
216. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2012).
217. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (2012).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
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mentally require honesty, but otherwise accommodate variations
based on “standards of fair dealing in the trade” and the specific “ex-
pectations of the parties.”
This duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context
suffers from none of the defects of the duty of loyalty.  First, this duty
is clearer and more definite than the duty of loyalty.  Honesty is
grounded in some core, verifiable, factual context.  Honesty is honesty,
and most people intuitively understand this obligation.219  “Fair deal-
ing in the trade” is not so definite, but, at least, incorporates some
objective standard by which conduct is to be judged: the customs in a
specific “trade” or industry.  The other component—the expectations
of the parties—is arguably as fuzzy as the concept of “loyalty.”  But at
least “expectations” is an ex ante proposition, and in the law of con-
tracts, is tied to “objective” and “reasonable expectations.”220  As ar-
gued above, deeming conduct “disloyal” can too easily be done after the
fact and based on a “gut instinct” of what loyalty entails.
Second, though the duty of good faith and fair dealing has a hard
core—honesty—it is also flexible, because its obligations can vary by
industry and the dealings between the parties (leading to their “expec-
tations”).  In contrast, the duty of loyalty imposes specific obliga-
tions—for example, do not compete and do not self-deal—regardless of
the nature of the business or the specific job at issue.  Thus, if it is a
common practice in New York City for an associate to solicit others
who do not make partner to leave, en masse, for another firm, it would
not be a breach of their duty of good faith and fair dealing to do so,
though it sounds like a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Third, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, derived as it is from
contract law, reflects commercial values of the marketplace.  Its busi-
ness-like foundation stands in stark contrast to the status relation-
ship from which the duty of loyalty was historically derived.
The employer’s immediate reaction to the proposal to eliminate the
duty of loyalty and substitute a duty of fair dealing would probably be
negative initially.  To eliminate the firm proscriptions against compe-
tition by the employee, self-dealing, and the more open-ended obliga-
tions that flow from the broadest definitions of “loyalty” may seem a
bad bargain.  But one wonders whether, at bottom, the employer
wouldn’t be more secure from employee transgressions and better able
to delegate and trust in good performance by relying on honesty rather
than loyalty.
219. But cf. “I did not have sexual relations with that woman.”
220. E.g., Daniel B. Bogart, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Leasing: The
Right Doctrine in the Wrong Transaction, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 275, 286 (2008)
(“The question really becomes whether a third person in the aggrieved party’s
shoes would reasonably believe that the breaching party acted in bad faith.”).
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From the employee’s point of view, it may be debatable whether
the duty of good faith and fair dealing would be more or less onerous
than the duty of loyalty.  It should be of some comfort to know that
conduct would be judged by some objective standards, rather than the
elusive concept of loyalty.  It would seem more dignified to owe a duty
of good faith and fair dealing—just as any person doing business in
the marketplace—rather than a duty of loyalty.  In general, the em-
ployee could openly compete with the employer and would not have to
worry about staying on the right side of the line between preparing to
compete and competing.  But as a concession for such freedom, he
would be obligated to honestly admit to the fact if questioned by the
employer.  It would seem the scales would definitely be tipped towards
favoring a duty of good faith and fair dealing, however, if that duty
were mutual.  Not only would the employer owe something “more” to
the employee than compensation—unlike in the duty of loyalty re-
gime—but at-will employees would then stand in this regard as equals
with their contract employee counterparts.
The assertion that the employer should owe a duty of good faith
and fair dealing, even to at-will employees, is not so very far-fetched.
In a few jurisdictions, this is already the law.221  The majority’s reluc-
tance to impose any such duty on employers “is primarily attributable
to the perceived tension between a[n] . . . employer obligation to act
honestly and fairly when terminating employees and an entrenched
employer right to terminate without any such limitations.”222  This
“perceived tension” ostensibly comes from two principal sources.
First, a duty of “good faith” would conflict with the employer’s right to
terminate an at-will relationship for any or no reason, including in
“bad faith.”223  Second, in the law of contracts, what is required of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot be inconsistent with the
terms of the contract.224  Because the employer in an at-will relation-
ship specifically retains the right to terminate, “it would be incongru-
221. E.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985);
Landry v. Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc., No. N11C-09-146 PLA 2011 Del. Super.
LEXIS 498, at *5–6 (Del. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 2011); Wade v. Kessler Inst., 778 A.2d
580, 584 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). See also Emily M.S. Houh, The Doc-
trine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 45–46 (discussing the implied obligation of good faith in at-will employ-
ment contracts).  Whether the duty of good faith and fair dealing applies in pre-
employment negotiations is a separate issue not here considered.
222. Brudney, supra note 168, at 808.
223. See, e.g., Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152, 156 (Me. 1991); Hunt v.
IBM Mid Am. Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 858–59 (Minn. 1986);
Hillesland v. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n of Grand Forks, 407 N.W.2d 206, 214 (N.D.
1987); Edelman v. Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 622 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Oh. Ct.
App. 1993); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983).
224. E.g., Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987).
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ous”225 to draw any inference “that the employer impliedly agreed to a
provision which would be destructive of his [unrestricted] right of
termination.”226
These apparent conflicts between a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing and the right to terminate at-will can, however, readily be elimi-
nated or minimized, and the perceived “tension” between the two
doctrines accordingly ameliorated, if not resolved.  An employment
law duty of good faith and fair dealing is modeled on, but not identical
to, the contract law duty and is not subject to the latter’s restrictions
and conventions.
As for the other perceived conflict, it is possible to define the duty
of good faith and fair dealing in this context more narrowly than it is
employed in contract law—given that it is not here a contractual obli-
gation—in order to minimize any infringement on the right to termi-
nate.  And this is precisely what has been done by those courts that
impose the duty on employers in an at-will relationship.  Thus, those
recognizing the duty resolve this perceived conflict by restricting “bad
faith” in this context to very specific conduct.  For example, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court defined four specific violations of the duty, which
categories are “narrowly defined and exclusive,”227 and center on em-
ployer conduct that is fraudulent and deceitful.228  In Delaware and
other states which impose the duty of good faith and fair dealing on
employers, the employer is also in breach if it terminates the employee
specifically to deprive the employee of compensation already owed.229
But a termination that is “bad, unjust, and unkind,”230 or contrary to
the employee’s “reasonable expectations,” does not breach the duty.231
Because fraud is itself actionable in tort, the only significant addi-
tional obligation the duty of good faith and fair dealing—as currently
defined by the courts—would impose on the employer is to pay what is
owed before terminating the employee, a limitation on the employer’s
right to which few reasonable people could object.
Nonetheless, it cannot be gainsaid that an employer’s duty of good
faith and fair dealing has the potential to conflict, to some extent, with
its right to freely terminate.  But when the application of two legal
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Landry v. Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc., No. N11C-09-146 PLA, 2011 Del. Super.
LEXIS 498, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2011).
228. Id.
229. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1995); Landry,
2011 Del. Super. LEXIS 498, at *6; Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d
744, 749 (Idaho 1989); York v. Zurich Scudder Invs., Inc., 849 N.E.2d 892, 898–99
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
230. York, 849 N.E.2d at 899 (quoting Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21,
28 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Id.
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doctrines poses an uncomfortable conflict, the courts do not ordinarily
perpetuate that conflict—creative minds craft workable solutions.  For
example, in recognition of the fact that the employee’s duty not to com-
pete with the employer conflicts with the employee’s vulnerability to
job termination and the overall public interest in labor mobility, the
courts created the exception for “preparing” to compete.232  If one ver-
sion of the “narrow and exclusive” restrictions on the employer’s right
to freely terminate—flowing from a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing—doesn’t quite suit, it does not follow that no duty can be imposed
at all.233  As one scholar observed, “[s]tates have developed a range of
nuanced approaches to other employment-related common law con-
cepts,”234 and should be able to do so in regard to a duty of good faith
and fair dealing.235
VI. CONCLUSION
The law governing the at-will employee’s duty of loyalty suffers
from multiple infirmities.  First, it does not apply to employers and
employees in a reciprocal manner.  Second, its intellectual provenance
harkens back to medieval concepts of master and servant that have
little, if anything, to do with today’s employment market.  Third, the
concept is unreasonably vague when applied to the infinite creativity
of at-will workers striving to achieve employment mobility, and cre-
ates a legal standard employees simply cannot understand as it ap-
plies to their everyday behavior.  Fourth, the case law readily reflects
that the duty of loyalty is unevenly applied, with most courts not even
bothering to analyze the “scope of employment,” for example.  In the
alternative, imposing a duty of good faith and fair dealing would elimi-
nate most of these issues and mitigate the remainder.
Why does this matter?  First, in a global economy, it is important
that the legal rules which form a key part of the employment relation-
ship not only be fair and reciprocal, but also be perceived as fair and
reciprocal.  Second, twenty-first century employment rules should be
based on twenty-first century employment conditions.  Vestiges of out-
moded and antiquated legal theories and constructs are ill-equipped to
232. Christopher Lyle McIlwain, Backstab: Competing with the Departing Employee,
29 CUMB. L. REV. 615, 622 (1998/1999) (“The tug-of-war between public policies
favoring free competition and individual economic mobility and those promoting
the integrity of the agency relationship has prompted the recognition of the right
of agent-employees to prepare to compete with their principals prior to leaving
their employ without incurring liability for breach of fiduciary duties.”).
233. Of course, a duty of good faith and fair dealing would have consequences on as-
pects of the employment relationship other than the right to terminate.  How-
ever, because the main objection to imposing the duty seems to be directed
towards the right to terminate, this has been the focus of the counter-argument.
234. Brudney, supra note 168, at 786.
235. Id.
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cope with the frequency and scope of employee mobility today.  Third,
a virtue of any legal system is that its rules are clear and the applica-
tion of those rules has predictable results.  Arguably, a duty of good
faith and fair dealing would go far towards achieving these objectives.
And how would such a significant change in employment law in the
United States come about?  A thoughtful model statute enacted in an
important state would inevitably invite comparison and imitation.  A
lodestar decision by a respected appellate court would attract aca-
demic attention and provide precedent for those that follow.  Perhaps,
the marketplace will simply rebel.  Employers or employees from “Gen
Z” may simply refuse to tolerate a system that is unfair, unpredict-
able, difficult to administer, and rooted in antiquated concepts which
governed the lord and his valet.
